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The doctrine of church autonomy 1 is distinct from the two more familiar lines of cases
decided under the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause, respectively. Routine
Establishment Clause disputes such as those over religious preferences, 2 government funding for
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Chapman, and Eric Treen. Copyright November 2021.
1
The term “church autonomy” was first used by law professor Paul G. Kauper in Church Autonomy and the First
Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 347 (1969). However, the concept of church
autonomy was pointedly recognized as being lodged in the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence as early as Mark
DeWolfe Howe, Foreward: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1953). Professor
Howe’s essay remarks on the Court’s recent decision in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
In lieu of church autonomy, some courts use the term “ecclesiastical abstention.” But “abstention” suggests
that the doctrine is discretionary. It is not. When it applies, church autonomy doctrine is a requirement of the First
Amendment.
2
See, e.g., Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 474 U.S. 703 (1985) (statute granting to private-sector employees the
unyielding right to have Sabbath accommodated was religious preference violative of Establishment Clause). On the
other hand, a religious exemption does not violate the Establishment Clause. See Corp. of Presiding Bishop v.
*
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religious entities, 3 and government-sponsored religious symbols 4 are now resolved by a series of
rules (not standards) followed over the last two decades by the High Court. 5 Stand-alone Free
Exercise Clause cases are resolved by first sorting those complaints charging that the
government has intentionally imposed a burden on a claimant’s religious beliefs or practices
(they get Lukumi-like 6 struct scrutiny) from complaints over laws that impose a religious burden
only as a consequence of neutral and generally applicable legislation (they get a pass under
Employment Division v. Smith, 7 as narrowed by Fulton v. City of Philadelphia 8). The threshold
task of sorting the Lukumi sheep from the Smith goats often presages whether the claim prevails
on the merits. In contrast, church autonomy has its own exclusive line of precedent running from
Watson v. Jones 9 through Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral 10—where the doctrine was first
recognized as having First Amendment stature—and culminating with renewed vigor for
religious institutional autonomy in the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision of Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC. 11

Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (holding that religious employer exemption to civil rights law did not violate the
Establishment Clause).
3
See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (state school voucher plan available to schools,
including religious schools, did not violate the Establishment Clause).
4
See, e.g., American Legion v. American Humanist Assoc., 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (plurality opinion, in part) (high
visibility World War I memorial featuring a 40-foot high Latin cross that was maintained by a state did not violate
Establishment Clause). Religious symbols are upheld if religiously inclusive when first commissioned and the
message does not disparage any faith.
5
The earlier period in which courts applied a three-prong standard is long dormant. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (Establishment Clause violated if law’s purpose is religious, its substantial effect is to
advance religion, or it resulted in excessive entanglement with religion).
6
See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (holding that city ordinances that were
gerrymandered to discriminate against church’s ritual sacrifice of animals violated Free Exercise Clause).
7
494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that generally applicable legislation, neutral as to religion, that has a disparate impact
on the religious practices of some does not state a claim under Free Exercise Clause).
8
141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (holding that a municipality may not terminate its foster-care services contract with a social
service provider on the ground that provider declines, for reasons of religious belief, to certify same-sex couples as
foster parents). The contract had a clause prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. It also had a
provision permitting individualized exceptions for good cause, yet the city had not exercised its discretion to
accommodate the provider’s religious beliefs. Fulton thus made it clear that a generally applicable law cannot
include exemptions or exceptions for secular reasons while denying them for religious reasons. To make an
accommodation for some but not for a religious belief or practice is to devalue religion. When the Court gets to
applying strict scrutiny, every free-exercise claim becomes an as-applied case. Here the municipality was unable to
show any substantial reason not to exempt this particular religious service provider, thus relief was ordered.
9
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872). There were disputes over the ownership of church property decided by the Supreme
Court long before Watson, but they were decided on bases other than the First Amendment and church autonomy.
These very early cases are collected at Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court’s Earliest Church-State Cases:
Windows on Religious-Cultural-Political Conflict in the Early Republic, 37 TULSA L. REV. 7 (2013).
10
344 U.S. 94.
11
565 U.S. 171 (2012).
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Stated differently, for some time now—but, one might say, hidden in plain sight—there
have been not two, but three different sorts of religious-freedom cases decided under the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. That explains why the Smith case, which is in the Free
Exercise Clause line of cases, was said by the Court to be inapplicable in Hosanna-Tabor, a
church autonomy case. 12 This sidestepping of Smith by the Hosanna-Tabor Court initially
puzzled a lot of legal scholars—and admittedly the Court did not at first explain the distinction
well. 13 But now that commentators have tumbled to the fact that there are three lines of cases that
cover the range of First Amendment religious-freedom claims, the threshold task of bringing to
bear the correct line of precedent is becoming routine. That the two Religion Clauses 14 have
given rise to three distinct lines of constitutional precedent is, of course, evidence of far deeper
goings on. And this essay will turn very shortly to the juridical and historical rationales that
underlie these distinctions.
The church autonomy line of precedent consists of only a dozen Supreme Court cases
decided upon plenary review. 15 The line is topped by the Court’s 2012 decision in HosannaId. at 189-90.
Speaking for the Hosanna-Tabor Court, Chief Justice Roberts wrote:
[A] church’s selection of its ministers is unlike an individual’s ingestion of peyote [as in
Employment Division v. Smith]. Smith involved government regulation of only outward physical
acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal church
decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself. See [Smith, 494 U.S.] at 877
(distinguishing the government’s regulation of “physical acts” from its “lend[ing] its power to one
or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma”).
565 U.S. at 190. Accordingly, there is a subject-matter class of cases to which the rule in Smith does not apply. The
Court characterized the firing of a teacher in Hosanna-Tabor as an “internal church decision,” meaning a decision of
self-governance, while characterizing the ingestion of peyote in Smith as an “outward physical act.” It follows that
the firing of the teacher regulated by the Americans with Disability Act was not an “outward physical act” but an
“internal church decision.” Contrasting “outward physical acts” with “internal decisions” was unhelpful and soon
abandoned.
14
U.S. CONST., AMEND. 1, begins “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” This is one clause with two participial phrases (“respecting an entablement”
and “prohibiting the free exercise”). Nevertheless, the longstanding convention is to refer to them as clauses rather
than phrases.
15
In chronological order, the Supreme Court’s principal church autonomy cases are: Watson, 80 U.S. 679 (involving
control over church property disputed by factions within a church); Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131,
139-40 (1872) (involving an attempted takeover of a church by rogue elements); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929) (involving the authority to appoint or remove a church minister); Kedroff, 344 U.S.
94 (involving a governmental attempt to alter the polity of a church); Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S.
190 (1960) (per curiam) (involving a governmental attempt to alter the polity of a church); Presbyterian Church v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (involving control over church property disputed by
factions within a church); Maryland & Va. Churches of God v. Church at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per
curiam) (involving control over church property disputed by factions within a church); Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (involving the authority to appoint or remove a church minister and to
reorganize the church polity); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (involving control over church property disputed
12
13
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Tabor, the importance of which cannot be overstated. The Court’s newest pronouncement on
church autonomy in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru is a reaffirmation and
clarification (some say a modest expansion) of who is a minister for purposes of the “ministerial
exception,” a defense available in civil rights antidiscrimination litigation.16 There is this third
line of Religion Clause precedent because the doctrine of church autonomy is about something
different from a personal right to religious liberty, the right more typically secured by the Free
Exercise Clause that shifts to the government the burden of strict-scrutiny balancing. In contrast,
the church autonomy doctrine is positioned by the Court to rest on both the Establishment Clause
and the Free Exercise Clause. 17 It is not a personal right rooted in an individual’s religious
beliefs, but a zone of protection for an entity’s internal governance that is attendant to the
organization’s religious character. Importantly, once the elements of the ministerial exception are
shown by the church or other religious organization to be present, the lawsuit is at an end; there
is no plaintiff’s rejoinder. 18 The doctrine thus affords the church a defense in the nature of a
categorical immunity—something like a government-free zone. 19
by factions within a church); Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (involving the rule prohibiting civil
authorities from taking up religious questions); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. 171 (involving application of the
ministerial exception); Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020) (involving
application of the ministerial exception).
There are additional cases rooted in church autonomy doctrine, but the Court attributed the result to a basis
different than the First Amendment. See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867) (holding that
priest cannot be deprived of ability to perform ecclesial duties because of failure to take exculpatory oath following
Civil War); Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. U.S., 143 U.S. 457 (1892) (refusing to apply to clergy legislation by
Congress forbidding aliens to come to U.S. for employment); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490
(1979) (adopting rule of construction that presumes religious organizations are exempt from congressional
regulatory statutes that would otherwise entangle government in matters of internal religious governance).
16
140 S. Ct. 2049. On what Our Lady adds to Hosanna-Tabor, see Helen M. Alvaré, Church Autonomy After Our
Lady of Guadalupe School: Too Broad? Or Broad As It Needs To Be? 25 TEX. REV. L. & POLITICS 319 (2021).
17
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 184 (“The Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers,
and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own.”);
id. at 188-89 (“By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a
religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments. According the state power to
determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits
government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.”); see also Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2060 (“State
interference in that sphere would obviously violate the free exercise of religion, and any attempt by government to
dictate or even to influence such matters would constitute one of the central attributes of an establishment of
religion.”).
18
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (“When a minister who has been fired sues her church alleging that her
termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us.”).
19
Id. at 194 (“The EEOC and Perich suggest that Hosanna-Tabor’s asserted religious reason for firing Perich . . .
was pretextual. That suggestion misses the point of the ministerial exception. The purpose of the exception is not to
safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead
ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister . . . is the church’s alone.”) (citations and footnote
omitted).
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The doctrine of church autonomy protects a relatively discrete field of internal operations
performed by religious organizations—a field described in Hosanna-Tabor as matters pertaining
to “the internal governance of the church.” 20 But if this zone of government-free operations is
relatively compact, these are functions that go to the very heart of a religious entity’s ability to
maintain control over the organization and command its destiny. Moreover, church autonomy is
an exclusive space for such internal operations, be they characterized as religious or secular. It is
for the church and similar religious entities to occupy this center of authority to the exclusion of
other powers. In short, the doctrine of church autonomy is doing different work by a different
means.
The scholarly literature on church autonomy is extensive, 21 with the number of articles on
the subject nearly outstripping the number of cases of this type reported by the federal courts of
appeal. While Hosanna-Tabor succinctly defined matters of church autonomy as those actions
that involve the “internal governance” of a religious organization, 22 and Kedroff limited the
operations to matters “strictly ecclesiastical,” 23 Part I of this article will show that the Supreme
Court’s church autonomy cases yield five protected areas for religious organizations. These are
the formation of religious doctrine and its interpretation; the choice of ecclesiology and

Id. at 188.
For scholars generally supportive of church autonomy, see Richard W. Garnett & John M. Robinson, HosannaTabor, Religious Freedom, and the Constitutional Structure, 2011–2012 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 307; Richard W.
Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) An Exposition, Translation, and Defense, 21 J. OF CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISS. 33 (2013); Douglas Laycock, Hosanna-Tabor and the Ministerial Exception, 35 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 839 (2012); Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 821
(2012); Marc O. DeGirolami, The Two Separations in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO THE FIRST AMENDMENT
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 396, 398-413 (Michael D. Breidenbach & Owen Anderson, eds. 2020); Christopher C.
Lund, Free Exercise Reconceived: The Logic and Limits of Hosanna-Tabor, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1183 (2014);
Steven D. Smith, Freedom of Religion or Freedom of the Church?, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO RELIGIOUS PRACTICES
IN THE UNITED STATES 267 (Austin Sarat ed., 2012); Richard W. Garnett, Religion and Group Rights: Are Churches
(Just) Like the Boy Scouts?, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT 515 (2007); Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious
Freedom, Church-State Separation, and the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 175, 179 (2011);
Michael P. Moreland, Religious Free Exercise and Anti-Discrimination Law, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1417 (2007). For a
positive reception to the idea of church autonomy but with reservations, see Andrew Koppelman, “Freedom of the
Church” and the Authority of the State, 21 J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL ISS. 145 (2013); John D. Inazu, The Freedom of
the Church (New Revised Standard Version), 21 J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL ISS. 335 (2013). For critics of church
autonomy, see Richard C. Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Lost in Translation: A Dilemma for Freedom of the
Church, 21 J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL ISS. 15 (2013); Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Against Religious
Institutionalism, 99 VA. L. REV. 917 (2013); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Dignity, History, and Religious-Group
Rights, 21 J. OF CONTEMP. LEGAL ISS. 273 (2013); Caroline Mala Corbin, The Irony of Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical
Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 951 (2012); Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of HosannaTabor, 88 INDIANA L.J. 981 (2013).
22
565 U.S. at 188.
23
344 U.S. at 119.
20
21
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organizational polity; the appointment, promotion, training, and removal of clergy, along with
other religious functionaries and policy leaders; the admission and removal of members,
including a determination of members and affiliates in good standing; and communication with
insiders about the foregoing subjects and activities, because such communications are necessary
to the enjoyment of the first four subject areas. As we shall see, claims are being made for church
autonomy that are overly broad, and yet other forces are pressuring to unduly constrain the
territory set aside by this rule of nonentanglement with the government.
Part II then identifies four types of legal claims and defenses that commonly arise in the
course of litigation where the doctrine of church autonomy is implicated: the defense known as
the “ministerial exception,” first raised in employment antidiscrimination claims; the rule
prohibiting the resolution of religious questions by civil authorities; the rules for resolving
internecine disputes between two factions within a church or denomination; and defamation
claims based on communications that arose out of ecclesiastical decisions and events.
The primary work of constitutional structure is keeping in right relationship centers of
power, including church and state, in contrast to elevating particular personal rights. Part III
takes up those features to church autonomy litigation that follow when the principle at work is
structural, separating government and church, as opposed to rights-based. That can affect a
surprising range of practices and procedures before a court reaches the merits, such as the
necessity for the trial court to resolve a church-autonomy defense at the outset of a lawsuit, lest
probing discovery and pre-trial motions themselves so entangle the church with civil judicial
process as to generate a fresh invasion of the autonomy doctrine. Because structure cannot be
waived, a church autonomy defense may be raised sui sponte.
Finally, Part IV surveys the relevant history from the American founding that speaks to
constitutional originalism and the things about a church that are not Caesar’s. In Western
Civilization, there is a long and rich history of differentiating between the operations of church
and those of empire (later “kingdom,” and still later “state”), the threads of which can be traced
all the way back to the 2nd century. 24 But as the Supreme Court observed first in Hosanna-Tabor
and again in Our Lady, the binding historical backdrop to the First Amendment is the colonial
and early national story of disestablishment. Revolutionary Americans broke away from the
See ROBERT LOUIS WILKEN, LIBERTY IN THE THINGS OF GOD: THE CHRISTIAN ORIGINS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
10-13 (2019).

24
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ideas of Christendom that undergirded the Church of England, as headed by the Crown and
established by Parliament, 25 and instead adopted the wholly novel principles that drove religious
disestablishment as a means of disentangling the church from the corrupting hand of government
in the newly forming states.
I.

FIVE SUBJECT MATTERS PROTECTED BY THE CHURCH AUTONOMY DOCTRINE

A helpful way of thinking about church-state relations is to envision two different entities
with a large territory of overlapping interests, but also with each having its own zone of
exclusive authority. Alternatively, a federal circuit court of appeals has suggested that the
concept of church autonomy is “best understood” as “marking a boundary between two separate
polities, the secular and the religious.” 26 These visual pictures raise the questions: What is the
zone occupied by the church to exclusion of the civil authorities? Where is this boundary line
that marks off the authority of the church to the exclusion of the state?
The Supreme Court has responded to these inquiries with general language, the most
quoted being a passage from Kedroff recognizing that the First Amendment grants “a spirit of
freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation—in
short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government
as well as those of faith and doctrine.” 27 Similarly, Milivojevich recited that the First Amendment
permits religious organizations “to establish their own rules and regulations for internal
discipline and government” and that civil authorities must defer to the decisions of such
organizations “on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom,
or law”; these same civil authorities are prohibited from delving into matters of “theological
controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of
the church to the standard of morals required of them.” 28 And Hosanna-Tabor recalled a passage
in Watson which says that “whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith or ecclesiastical rule,
custom or law” have been resolved by a church, the matter is closed and not to be relitigated by
the civil authorities. 29 An equally general passage appeared in Our Lady in explanation of the
unanimous result in Hosanna-Tabor: “The constitutional foundation for our holding was the

Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2061-62, 2065-66; Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182-85.
Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 677 (7th Cir. 2013).
27
344 U.S. at 116 (footnote omitted).
28
426 U.S. at 713, 714, 724.
29
565 U.S. at 185 (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. at 727).
25
26
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general principle of church autonomy to which we have already referred: independence in
matters of faith and doctrine and in closely linked matters of internal government.” 30
Accordingly, the doctrine of church autonomy extends a zone of independence to those relatively
few but “core” administrative practices and “key” personnel functions that go to the control and
destiny of a religious entity. 31
While this general language is a helpful starting point, more detail is needed to solve
close disputes. From the full range of the High Court’s case law, we know that church autonomy
has been found to protect five areas of internal governance over which a religious organization is
sovereign: (1) the determination and interpretation of religious doctrine; 32 (2) the determination
of the organization’s polity or governance structure, including its embodiment in canons and
bylaws; 33 (3) the hiring, training, supervising, promoting, and removing of clergy, worship

Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2061. Also commonly cited is Justice William Brennan’s concurring opinion in Corp. of
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, joined by Justice Thurgood Marshall, which delved into the church autonomy theme:
[R]eligious organizations have an interest in autonomy in ordering their internal affairs, so that they
may be free to: “select their own leaders, define their own doctrines, resolve their own disputes, and
run their own institutions.” . . . For many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large
measure from participation in a larger religious community. Such a community represents an
ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere aggregation of
individuals. Determining that certain activities are in furtherance of an organization’s religious
mission, and that only those committed to that mission should conduct them, is thus a means by
which a religious community defines itself.
483 U.S. at 341-42 (quoting Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1389 (1981)).
31
140 S. Ct. at 2055 (“core”); Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 199 (Alito, J., concurring) (“key”).
32
See Church at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. at 368 (holding that courts cannot adjudicate doctrinal disputes);
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449-51 (refusing to follow a rule that discourages changes in doctrine); Watson,
80 U.S. at 725-33 (rejecting implied-trust rule because of its departure-from-doctrine inquiry); see also Thomas, 450
U.S. at 715-16 (holding that courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation); Order of St. Benedict v. Steinhauser,
234 U.S. 640, 647-51 (1914) (finding that religious practices concerning vow of poverty and communal ownership
of property are not violative of individual liberty and will be enforced by the courts).
Care must be exercised to not confuse the determination or interpretation of doctrine, which are covered by
church autonomy, with the application of doctrine. All manner of activities and expressions could sincerely be said
to be an application of one’s understanding of his religious doctrine, but that does not make them a matter of church
autonomy. The application of doctrine, rather, is a matter to be addressed as a straightforward claim under the Free
Exercise Clause. The Texas Supreme Court recently confused the determination of doctrine with its application in In
re Diocese of Lubbock. 624 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. 2021), petition for cert. filed, 2021 WL 4173594 (U.S. Sept. 13,
2021) (No. 21-398). In that case—a claim for defamation—the court mistakenly regarded as a protected
determination of doctrine a diocese’s decision about releasing to the public a list of clerics credibly accused of
having abused a minor. This decision, however, is best understood as a practical application of doctrine, not a
determination of doctrine, and thus not protected by the doctrine of church autonomy.
33
See Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 708-24 (civil courts may not probe into church polity); Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. at 451 (civil courts may not interpret and weigh church doctrine); Kreshik, 363 U.S. at 191 (First Amendment
prevents judiciary, as well as legislature, from interfering in ecclesiastical governance of Russian Orthodox Church);
Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 119 (same); Shepard v. Barkley, 247 U.S. 1, 2 (1918) (aff’d mem.) (courts may not interfere
with merger of two Presbyterian denominations).
30
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leaders, and other employees with explicitly religious functions as well as policy leaders; 34 (4)
the determination of who is admitted to and expelled from membership, as well as which
members and affiliates are in good standing; 35 and (5) internal communications of the religious
organization pertaining to the full enjoyment of the prior four subjects.
Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, is illustrative of the fifth item
concerning internal communications that are instrumental to the enjoyment of the prior four
categories. 36 In Bryce, an Episcopalian church was sued by the youth minister and her domestic
partner. Local church authorities had discovered that the youth minister was in a homosexual
relationship. She was promptly transferred to duties that did not entail contact with youth and she
was told she would be dismissed at the end of the year. At follow-on church meetings, the same
authorities communicated to parents of the youth that the youth minister’s same-sex relationship
was the reason for her reassignment. The minister and her partner were present at and
participated in these meetings. Among the various legal claims later brought by the couple was
sexual harassment based on the exposure of their same-sex relationship during the meetings. The
trial and circuit courts held that the church’s internal communications were protected by church
autonomy. 37 The youth minister herself—as an employee of the defendant—was subject to the
third category of church autonomy: the ministerial exception. But the youth minister’s partner,
though not employed by the church, was also subject to the general doctrine of church autonomy,

34
See Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2062; Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190-95; Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 708-20 (civil
courts may not probe into defrocking of cleric); Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116 (courts may not probe into clerical
appointments); Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16 (declining to intervene on behalf of petitioner who sought order directing
archbishop to appoint petitioner to ecclesiastical office). See also Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 501-04 (refusal by
Court to force collective bargaining on parochial school because of interference with relationship between church
superiors and lay teachers); Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 472 (1892) (refusing to
apply generally applicable law preventing employment of aliens to church's clerical appointment); Cummings, 71
U.S. 277 (unconstitutional to prevent priest from assuming his ecclesiastical position because of refusal to take
loyalty oath).
35
See Bouldin, 82 U.S. at 139-40 (“This is not a question of membership of the church, nor of the rights of members
as such. It may be conceded that we have no power to revise or question ordinary acts of church discipline, or of
excision from membership. . . . [W]e cannot decide who ought to be members of the church, nor whether the
excommunicated have been regularly or irregularly cut off.”); Watson, 80 U.S. at 733 (court has no jurisdiction over
church discipline or the conformity of church members to the standard of morals required of them). See also Order
of St. Benedict, 234 U.S. at 647-51 (so long as individual voluntarily joined a religious group and is free to leave at
any time, religious liberty is not violated and members are bound to prior rules consensually entered into, such as
vow of poverty and communal ownership of property). The subject of autonomy does not include the “discipline” of
members, which could be quite far reaching. But this point and the next do include the confidential communication
to other members concerning the discipline or expulsion of a member.
36
289 F.3d 648 (10th Cir. 2002).
37
Id. at 657-59.
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but under the fifth category which safeguards internal communications. The communications
were relevant to the governance of the church in order to explain to the church members and
parents the reason for the abrupt reassignment of the youth minister to whom some of the
children had become attached. The claim by the minister’s partner was also dismissed because
her complaint of sexual harassment was derivative of the protected employment decision to
dismiss the youth minister. 38
Legal counsel to religious organizations sometimes try to shoehorn a case into a category
where it does not belong. Illustrative is an argument made in a brief amici curia filed in support
of a petition for writ of certiorari in Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany v. Lacewell. 39 The
question presented in Lacewell concerns New York legislation requiring employers to provide
health care benefits to employees that includes coverage for elective abortions. Naturally enough,
pro-life religious organizations object to compliance with the law as violating their right to free
exercise of religion. Plaintiffs certainly appear to meet the threshold of stating a prima facie
claim for relief under the Free Exercise Clause. However, amici argued that the New York
abortion mandate violates church autonomy. 40 This is not so. The New York legislation does not
itself seek to regulate a religious organization’s internal governance as the U.S. Supreme Court
uses that term. True, the state law certainly imposes a substantial burden on such an
organization’s application of its religious doctrine concerning the unborn, but it does not
determine or interpret that doctrine. A straightforward free-exercise claim is altogether different
from a church autonomy claim. 41 The danger of overreach by legal counsel for the church, or in

Id. at 658-59, 658 n.2.
Petition for cert. filed, 2021 WL 1670283 (U.S. Apr. 23, 2021) (No. 20-1501), brief docketed May 7, 2021,
available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/20/201501/176496/20210423144447105_Roman%20Catholic%20Diocese%20of%20Albany%20v.%20Lacewell%20%20Cert%20Petition.pdf.
40
Brief of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints et al., Lacewell, No. 20-1501 (filed May 26, 2021), available
at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/20/20-1501/180185/20210526121754439_201501acTheChurchOfJesusChristOfLatter-DaySaints.pdf. On November 1, 2021, the Supreme Court granted the
petition for certiorari, vacated the opinion below, and remanded with directions to reconsider the case in light of its
decision in Fulton. Order List (11/01/2021) (supremecourt.gov). Fulton is a free exercise case not a church
autonomy case, so this disposition is entirely consistent with the discussion in the text.
41
This is why cases like Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Calif. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990) and Tony &
Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290 (1985) are distinguishable from cases involving the
church autonomy doctrine. Church autonomy extends to the formation and revision of doctrine, but not the
application or practice of doctrine. The argument that a wage and hour law or a use tax imposes a substantial burden
on a religious organization is to be taken up as a straightforward claim under the Free Exercise Clause. That was
done in both Jimmy Swaggart and Alamo Foundation, albeit the claims were ultimately unsuccessful.
38
39
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this instances the amici, the civil courts might not just reject the argument but might overshoot
and unduly narrow the doctrine of church autonomy.
II.

IN WHAT SORTS OF DISPUTES IS CHURCH AUTONOMY APPLICABLE?

What are the common patterns of disputes or the sorts of factual settings where church
autonomy has often been implicated? As the case law has unfolded, the doctrine of church
autonomy has been frequently invoked in four dispute patterns: (1) a plaintiff sues a religious
entity for employment discrimination (or a related common-law claim), and the entity invokes
the ministerial exception to block the lawsuit; (2) a lawsuit raises questions that concern the
validity, meaning, or importance of religious assertions or disputes, and civil authorities refuse to
take up those questions; (3) a disagreement between two factions within a church or
denomination is brought before the civil authorities, who then defer to the determination by the
highest ecclesial judicatory; and (4) a party sues for defamation based on communications that
arose out of a matter of internal governance, and the defendant pleads church autonomy as a
defense. As to the third pattern, in lieu of deferring to the proper ecclesial judicatory, the
Supreme Court has permitted states the alternative of adopting a rule of decision characterized as
“neutral principles of law.” Resort to this alternative, however, has been permitted by the
Supreme Court only in cases where the two factions have abandoned attempts at resolving their
underlying doctrinal differences and decided to go their separate ways, thus the only matter that
remains for civil resolution via “neutral principles” is who gets legal title to the church property.
Although most church autonomy cases fall into one of these four patterns, this list is not a
closed set. Occasionally there are matters outside these patterns where church autonomy is still
applicable. For example, the principles behind the ministerial exception have been found
applicable where the disputing parties lack an employment relationship. 42 The exemption was
also found to apply when a state university sought to control the moral qualifications of the
leaders of student religious organizations on its campus. 43 And on occasion, courts have declined

See, e.g., Bryce, 289 F.3d at 657-59 (holding that in a lawsuit where there were two plaintiffs and one was not an
employee of the church, the church autonomy defense was still applicable to the nonemployee).
43
See, e.g., InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v. Bd. of Governors of Wayne State Univ., 2021 WL 1387787
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 13, 2021) (overturning university regulation barring student religious organizations from having
statement of faith and morality code requirements for student leaders).
42
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to entertain a lawsuit asserting a right to attain or hold an uncompensated ecclesiastical
appointment. 44
A. The Ministerial Exception
The “ministerial exception” is an affirmative defense in the nature of a categorical
immunity enjoyed by churches and similar religious entities that prevents them from being sued
by employees whose job description includes religious functions. 45 The term ministerial
exception is widely acknowledged to be a misnomer, 46 but the courts and commentators have yet
to settle on a more apt label. 47 For example, the ministerial exception applies to more than just
claims brought by clergy, members of a religious order, and other ecclesiastics. Rather, it applies
to any executive leader or worship leader of a religious organization, and to any employee of a
religious organization with duties some of which are explicitly religious in function. 48
Furthermore, “minister” is largely a Protestant term. Catholic and Orthodox Christians generally
do not use the term, nor do Jews, Muslims, and others. 49
The ministerial exception is a defense to more than just claims by employees of churches
and other houses of worship. The defense extends to entities that engage in explicitly religious

See, e.g., Chavis v. Roe, 93 N.J. 103, 459 A.2d 674 (1983) (involving a claim for damages by a deacon and his
wife being defrocked and removed from his post, apparently over a dispute with the pastor; after expressing some
doubt as to whether one’s status as a deacon entailed a loss for which there could be a remedy, the court dismissed
citing First Amendment concerns).
45
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4 (concluding that the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense). For
more discussion on church autonomy as an affirmative defense, see infra notes 213-26 and accompanying text.
46
Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2064; Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 198-99 (Alito, J., concurring).
47
One suggestion is to start referring to the “ministerial exception” as “church autonomy” because the exception is a
sub-application of that doctrine. Without any confusion or loss in meaning, Justice Alito did that on one occasion in
Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2061.
48
Id. at 2064 (“[T]he exception should include ‘any employee who leads a religious organization, conducts worship
services or important religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith.’”) (quoting
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 199 (Alito, J., concurring)). Our Lady and Hosanna-Tabor involved religious
elementary school teachers as ministers. Other cases have found to satisfy the definition of ministers a religious
school principal, Rehfield v. Diocese of Joliet, 2021 IL 125656 (2021); a church minister of music, EEOC v. Roman
Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000); an archdiocese’s communications manager, AliceaHernandez v. Archdiocese of Chicago, 2002 WL 598517 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 18, 2002); and the chair of the religion
department and campus chaplain at a Catholic college, Simon v. Saint Dominic Acad., 2021 WL 1660851 (D.N.J.
Apr. 28, 2021). See also Starkey v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Inc., 2021 WL 3669050 (S.D. Ind.
Aug. 11, 2021) (guidance counselor and member of faculty administrative team at Catholic high school found to
meet the definition of minister); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Catholic University
faculty member in the canon law department is minister); EEOC v. Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277
(5th Cir. 1981) (faculty and administrators at a seminary are ministers). Cf. DeWeese-Boyd v. Gordon College, 163
N.E.3d 1000 (Mass. 2021) (member of faculty teaching social work at Christian college is not a minister for
purposes of ministerial exception), petition for cert. filed, 2021 WL 3406193 (U.S. Aug. 3, 2021) (No. 21-145). See
generally Christopher Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2011) (collecting cases).
49
Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2063-64; Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 198 (Alito, J., concurring).
44
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activities similar or related to those of a church, such as K-12 religious schools that seek to
transmit the faith to the next generation. 50 It makes less sense, however, to allow the defense by
an entity that is marginally religious or that is religious in origin but that over time has largely
secularized. 51 Simply put, the doctrine seeks to preserve the sovereignty of religious
organizations that at least partly and genuinely engage in explicitly religious activities such as
prayer, worship, observing sacraments, proselytizing, teaching religion, spiritual formation, or
otherwise deepening or expanding the faith. That means entities that fall outside the scope of
worship, teaching, propagating the faith, and so on ought not to be able to rely on the
immunity.52
But how is a civil magistrate to determine that an employer is truly religious so as to
benefit from the ministerial exception without violating the rule against civil authorities taking
up questions about what is or is not central or important to a religion? 53 The manner by which
this is worked out consistent with the First Amendment is illustrated by a recent administrative
labor-law ruling. For reasons of church autonomy, lay faculty at a religious college are not
permitted to organize a labor union under the National Labor Relations Act. 54 Prior case law had
recognized collective bargaining rights for lay faculty unless a college was deemed “substantially
religious in character.” 55 That put the National Labor Relations Board in the position of making
exacting inquiries into the curriculum, faculty tasks, and faith tenor of the student culture on
campus, and then probing the religious importance the college puts on these matters. However,
judging the degree of religiosity concerning matters of campus life would be unconstitutionally
In addition to churches and K-12 religious schools, courts have applied the ministerial exception to a religious
university and a seminary. See Catholic Univ. of America, 83 F.3d 455; Sw. Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d
277. In concept, there is no reason the exception would not be applicable to a religious charity and religious health
care provider. See Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2007) (church-related hospital). In
all instances, however, the employer has to meet the definition of a religious organization that has not secularized,
and the employee concerned has to meet the definition of a minister.
51
See NLRB v. St. Louis Christian Home, 663 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1981) (upholding NLRB jurisdiction because home
organized as religious but over the years had secularized); Fike v. United Methodist Children’s Home, 547 F. Supp.
286 (E.D. Va. 1982), aff’d on other grounds, 709 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1983) (children’s home that had abandoned its
religious purpose lost benefit of ministerial exception).
52
This is somewhat akin to what is done with the religious employer exemption in § 702(a) of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. If challenged, the employer needs to convince a court that it is sufficiently religious to invoke
the exemption. See Spencer v. World Vision, Inc., 633 F.3d 723, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (developing an
approach for determining who is a seriously religious organization and thus able to invoke the religious employer
exemption in Title VII); LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Community Center, 503 F.3d 217, 226-29 (3d Cir. 2007)
(same).
53
The rule against civil authorities taking up religious disputes is discussed infra Part II.B.
54
See Bethany College and Thomas Jorsch and Lisa Guinn, 369 NLRB 1 (No. 98, June 10, 2020).
55
Id. at 2-3.
50
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entangling. 56 To avoid transgressing the rule against civil authorities resolving religious
questions, the NLRB’s new three-part inquiry looks only to whether a college: (1) was formed as
a nonprofit religious corporation or similar entity; (2) currently holds itself out to the public as
religious; and (3) is affiliated with a church, denomination, or a defined body of creedal or
religious teachings. 57 These three findings are mere factual inquiries about a religious institution
(i.e., its objective characteristics) and thus can be noted by civil authorities without entangling
the state in internal religious disputes.
The ministerial exception was first recognized in the early 1970s by the federal courts of
appeal in claims brought by clerics alleging employment discrimination by their churches. 58
Because there was no split in the circuits, the U.S. Supreme Court did not get around to affirming
the ministerial exception until decades later in Hosanna-Tabor. 59 In that case, the Court
ultimately determined that an elementary school teacher was a minister for purposes of the
exception. However, before taking up that question, Chief Justice John Roberts—writing for the
Court—had to distinguish Employment Division v. Smith. 60 In Smith, the state of Oregon had
listed peyote, a hallucinogenic, as one of several controlled substances and criminalized its use.
The plaintiffs in Smith were Native Americans who had been employed as counselors at a private
drug rehabilitation center. 61 They were fired for illegal drug use after supervisors learned they
ingested peyote as part of a religious ceremony. They were later denied unemployment
compensation by the state because they were dismissed for cause. The Smith Court held that the
Free Exercise Clause was not implicated where Oregon enacted a generally applicable drug law
that was neutral as to religion, even though the law happened to burden the religious use of
peyote.

56
Colo. Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1265 (10th Cir. 2008) (ruling that “pervasively religious” test
was unconstitutionally entangling); see Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 739, 828 (2000) (plurality op.) (statutory
exemption unconstitutionally requires state officials to go illicitly “trolling through a person’s or institution’s
religious beliefs”).
57
Bethany College, 369 NLRB at 3-4.
58
The first federal court of appeals to recognize—as well as name—the ministerial exception was McClure v.
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972). See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188 n.2 (briefly tracing
development of ministerial exception in lower courts).
59
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188.
60
494 U.S. 872. Smith’s “generally applicable” test was recently narrowed in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S.
Ct. 1868. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. But Fulton does not alter the way Hosanna-Tabor distinguished
the Smith line of free-exercise cases and therefore not applicable to a church autonomy case like Hosanna-Tabor.
61
Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
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Chief Justice Roberts admitted that the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) was a
neutral law of general applicability that happened to have an adverse effect on the Lutheran
school’s personnel decisions. 62 But he then drew a distinction: “The present case, in contrast [to
Smith], concerns government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith
and mission of the church itself.” 63 A civil court rendering a judgment in such a case would be
commanding a church to employ a minister—just like the behavior of a state with an established
church. Thus, there is a class of cases to which the rule in Smith does not apply: those involving
decisions within a church’s sphere of internal governance. The Court’s putting aside Smith as
inapplicable confirms that church autonomy doctrine gives rise to a third line of cases separate
from the line involving personal religious rights protected by the Free Exercise Clause, as well as
separate from the Establishment Clause lines of precedent that challenge religious preferences or
government funding of faith-related organizations. 64
A peyote sacrament is obviously an important religious practice, and the Smith plaintiffs
suffered a material burden on a Native American religious observance that was unrelieved
because of the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Smith. But the purpose of church
autonomy is not to lift personal religious burdens as such. If it were, then Hosanna-Tabor would
have been directly at odds with Smith and thereby overruled it. That did not happen. Rather,
Hosanna-Tabor distinguished Smith. Hosanna-Tabor was about the government’s intrusion into
the zone of internal governance of the religious school—a church autonomy case. Moreover,
these protected acts of internal self-governance need not be religiously motivated. As the
Hosanna-Tabor Court observed, “[t]he purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a church’s
decision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason.” 65 Rather, the purpose of
church autonomy is to set aside the five subject matters that comprise the zone of internal
governance and keep them autonomous from civil government. Our Lady presented the same
issue. The teachers pointed out that they were not being dismissed for religious reasons. But with
the defense of church autonomy, it made no difference that the reasons were secular, as the Court
pointed out with this illustration:

Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 189-90.
Id. at 190.
64
See supra notes 3-11 and accompanying text.
65
565 U.S. at 194.
62
63
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Think of the quintessential case where a church wants to dismiss the minister for
poor performance. The church’s objection in that situation is not that the minister
has gone over to some other faith but simply that the minister is failing to perform
essential functions in a satisfactory manner. 66
What matters is not religious injury as such, but that the actions of the employer fall
within one of the five autonomous subject matters.
The difference in the nature of the injury that flows from rights-based claims as opposed
to structural claims can be seen by contrasting the Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause cases
with its Establishment Clause decisions. The Free Exercise Clause is rights-based, and thus the
only injury it can remedy is a religious injury. In contrast, the Establishment Clause is structural,
separating two centers of authority, and the court in maintaining this church-state structure will
redress both religious and nonreligious injuries. Examples of the latter are economic harm in the
67

68

form of increased labor costs or loss of a liquor license, loss of academic freedom, and
69

freedom of thought for atheists. Because the doctrine of church autonomy, like the
Establishment Clause, is structural, it should come as no surprise that the doctrine gives redress
for both religious and secular injuries. In Hosanna-Tabor, immunity from liability for
employment discrimination and retaliation was a form of shielding from interference with
internal governance.
In Hosanna-Tabor, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission—which intervened
on behalf of the teacher—claimed that there was no ministerial exception because the First
Amendment did not require one. All that was required, argued the EEOC, was that the
141 S. Ct. at 2068.
See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (upholding claim of department store against labor
law); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (upholding claim of tavern seeking issuance of a liquor
license); cf. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1961) (permitting claim of economic harm by retail
stores to be free of Sunday-closing law, but ultimately ruling against the stores on the merits); Two Guys from
Harrison Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (same).
68
See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (striking down a state law that required teaching of creation in
public school science classes if evolution is taught); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking down a
state prohibition on teaching evolution in public school science classes).
69
See Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). In Torcaso, an atheist who otherwise qualified for a public office
refused to take a required oath that professed belief in God. The Court held the oath requirement violative of the
First Amendment without specifying either religion clause. If an individual objects to the oath out of a religious
belief that forbids taking oaths, then he has a valid claim under the Free Exercise Clause. As an atheist, however, the
claimant in Torcaso did not suffer a religious injury as he professed to have no religious beliefs. Nevertheless, for a
state to mandate taking of the oath would be a violation of the Establishment Clause as to all office seekers,
including atheists, because confession of belief in a deity is a subject that remains in the realm of religion.
66
67
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government be formally neutral with respect to religion and religious organizations. That was the
case here, said the EEOC, because the ADA treats religious organizations just like every other
employer when it comes to discrimination on the basis of disability. The agency argued that the
same was true of federal and state civil rights statutes prohibiting discrimination with respect to
other protected classes. The EEOC allowed that religious organizations had freedom of
expressive association, but so did labor unions and service clubs, and they were still subject to
the ADA. 70 Equality was the only requirement, argued the EEOC. The nondiscrimination
statutes could be blind to religion and religious organizations and still not violate the First
Amendment. Accordingly, while Congress could choose to accommodate religion when enacting
legislation, maintained the EEOC, the First Amendment did not require it to do so.
The Court reacted to the EEOC’s argument for a religion-blind Constitution by calling it
“remarkable,” “untenable,” and “hard to square with the text of the First Amendment itself,
which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.” 71 The text of the First
Amendment recognizes the status of organized religion as more than a mere voluntary
association vested with the aggregate rights of its individual members. Church autonomy
doctrine recognizes that a properly conceived structuring of church and state is to the benefit of
both. 72 Accordingly, the Hosanna-Tabor Court regarded the ministerial exception as a defense in
the nature of an immunity. 73
Downstream of Hosanna-Tabor, a good part of the litigation has focused on the scope of
the definition of “minister” for purposes of the immunity. That was the situation in Our Lady, 74
where the High Court focused on ensuring that the ministerial exception not be woodenly
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188-89.
Id. The Court wrote:
We find [the EEOC] position [on this point] untenable. The right to freedom of association is a right
enjoyed by religious and secular groups alike. It follows under the EEOC’s . . . view that the First
Amendment analysis should be the same, whether the association in question is the Lutheran church,
a labor union or a social club . . . . That result is hard to square with the text of the First Amendment
itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations. We cannot accept the
remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization’s
freedom to select its own ministers.
Id. at 189.
72
See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (“[T]he First Amendment rests upon the
premise that both religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each is left free from the other
within its respective sphere.”); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (The Establishment Clause’s “first and
most immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government
and to degrade religion.”).
73
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188-90, 195 n.4.
74
140 S. Ct. 2049.
70
71
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defined. The Ninth Circuit in Our Lady had read narrowly the Supreme Court’s holding in
Hosanna-Tabor concerning who is a minister. Hosanna-Tabor had found that a fourth-grade
teacher, Cheryl Perich, was a minister, and that for reasons of church autonomy her claim should
be dismissed. By taking classes in theology, Perich had earned a lay religious title conferred by
her denomination. She went on to hold herself out as a minister in recognition of her completed
coursework and lay title, and she claimed an income tax advantage available only to ministers.
Perich was not a local church officer, worship leader, or denominational executive, but on the
whole her duties reflected a key role in transmitting the Lutheran faith to her students. 75
When addressing the breadth of the ministerial exception, the Ninth Circuit in Our Lady
had treated the facts leading to the determination that Perich was a minister as four requirements
on a checklist. 76 The High Court reversed. Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Samuel Alito
began by noting that the ministerial exception is a subpart of the “general principle of church
autonomy” that relies on both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. 77 The Court said:
The independence of religious institutions in matters of faith and doctrine is closely
linked to independence in what we have termed “matters of church government.” .
. . This does not mean that religious institutions enjoy a general immunity from
secular laws, but it does protect their autonomy with respect to internal management
decisions that are essential to the institution’s central mission. And a component of
this autonomy is the selection of the individuals who play certain key roles.
. . . Under this rule, courts are bound to stay out of employment disputes involving
those holding certain important positions with churches and other religious
institutions. . . . [A] wayward minister’s preaching, teaching, and counseling could
contradict the church’s tenets and lead the congregation away from the faith. The
ministerial exception was recognized to preserve a church’s independent authority
in such matters. 78
The Our Lady Court went on to find that the two classroom teachers at Catholic elementary
schools in California were ministers for purposes of the immunity. Their claims alleged
employment discrimination on the basis of age and disability, respectively, when their annual
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191-94.
140 S. Ct. at 2066-67.
77
Id. at 2060 (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 186).
78
Id. at 2060-61 (citations, internal quotations, and footnotes omitted).
75
76
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employment contracts were not renewed. The nonrenewal was said by the schools to be based on
poor performance and not acquiring new skills—what you might call “secular” reasons. 79 But the
application of the ministerial exception did not hinge on the schools having a religious reason for
severing the employment. This makes sense because what is protected by church autonomy
doctrine is a sphere of “autonomy with respect to internal management decisions that are
essential to the institution’s central mission” (whether that decision be characterized as secular or
religious), not a personal right of religious liberty vested in the employer. 80
The Court admitted that it would have been easier to find that the elementary teachers
were ministers if they had satisfied all of the four items that had been present in Hosanna-Tabor.
But Our Lady held that none of those items was essential. 81 What matters are the actual job
functions of the employee. 82 The two classroom teachers had duties that were explicitly
religious. They taught classes in Catholic doctrine, led their students in classroom prayer and
recitation of Christian creeds, accompanied the students to a weekly mass, and signed annual
employment contracts that set forth the religious mission of the school and required that they
pledge to do nothing to undermine it. 83 By the employment contract, the teachers “were also
expected to guide their students, by word and deed, toward the goal of living their lives in
accordance with the faith.” 84 Moreover, so long as some of their employment functions were
explicitly religious, it did not matter how much clock time the religious functions comprise in the
teacher’s overall school day. 85 For example, the explicitly religious functions could have
comprised only 10 percent of a 40-hour workweek. And the institutions here were K-12 religious
schools, which are viewed by the church as integral to passing on the Catholic faith to the next
generation. 86 When “a school with a religious mission entrusts a teacher with the responsibility
of educating and forming students in the faith, judicial intervention into disputes between the
school and the teacher threatens the school’s independence in a way that the First Amendment
does not allow.” 87
Id. at 2058, 2059.
Id. at 2060.
81
Id. at 2062, 2063.
82
Id. at 2064.
83
Id. at 2056-60.
84
Id. at 2066.
85
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 193-94 (the question of who is a minister is not resolved by a stopwatch).
86
Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2065-66 (noting the importance of religious schools to Puritans, Jews, Muslims,
Mormons, and Seventh-day Adventists).
87
Id. at 2069.
79
80

19

When considering whether the ministerial exception applies, rather than inquiring
whether the employee is a minister in the ordinary sense of that term (e.g., pastor, priest, rabbi,
imam, and so on), the Court asks one of two questions: (1) At some point in the workweek, does
the employee perform some explicitly religious function, as was the case in Our Lady and
Hosanna-Tabor? (2) Does the employee hold a position of executive leadership or have a role in
leading worship or ritual? 88 If the answer to either question is in the affirmative, then the
immunity applies.
In the fact-finding necessary to determine if an employee meets the definition of a
minister, the civil courts cannot get entangled in deciding whether certain employee tasks are
religiously important or meaningful as opposed to religiously peripheral or minor. 89 Justice
Alito, writing for the Court in Our Lady, made a point of warning that this sort of judicial
entanglement in religious questions had long been unconstitutional. 90 Justice Clarence Thomas
filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, stating that the determination as to
who is a minister ought to be unilaterally decided by the religious employer to avoid having
courts delve into prohibited religious questions. 91 Justice Alito, for the Court, did not go that far.
The determination remains a question for the civil courts. Nevertheless, the Court’s approach
was highly deferential to the two Catholic schools regarding the employers’ view that some of
the teachers’ job functions were religious. 92 Justice Alito noted the explicitly religious functions
of the teachers here: teaching the Catholic religion, leading students in prayer and devotionals,
Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188, 196.
See infra Part II.B.
90
Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2063 n.10.
91
Id. at 2069-71 (Thomas. J., concurring, joined by Justice Gorsuch). Justice Thomas made the same argument in
Hosanna-Tabor. 565 U.S. at 196-98 (Thomas, J., concurring). There are problems with Justice Thomas’ suggestion.
He would leave the question of who is a minister to be unilaterally determined by the defendant/employer. The lack
of checks and balances invites exaggerated claims with respect to a dispositive defense. Even more fundamentally,
church autonomy is ranked by the positive law as a categorical immunity higher than all other defenses. But it is
nonetheless a rule subject to the positive law, not above the law.
92
Our Lady, 140 S. Ct at 2066-69. There is no attempt in this article to catalogue all of the developing, sometimes
contradictory, lower court cases as to who is found to be a “minister” for purposes of the defense. See, e.g., Sw.
Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982) (finding faculty and administrators
were “ministers” for purposes of the ministerial exception); InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA, 2021 WL
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and attending mass with the students. These tasks, of course, are widely recognized to be
explicitly religious practices for Christians. As to other religions, as well as other types of
religious organizations besides churches (e.g., colleges, health clinics, and welfare providers),
Justice Alito appealed to religious employers to make it clear in advance (perhaps in an
employment contract or employee handbook) which employees perform what the employer
considers to be explicitly religious functions:
In a country with the religious diversity of the United States, judges cannot be
expected to have a complete understanding and appreciation of the role played by
every person who performs a particular role in every religious tradition. A religious
institution’s explanation of the role of such employees in the life of the religion in
question is important. 93
The conundrum over who ultimately decides who is a minister is, as noted by Justice Thomas,
not entirely resolved by the Court’s opinion in Our Lady.
Looking for ways to circumvent Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady, counsel for plaintiffs
have sought to distinguish claims of discrimination in hiring, promotion, and dismissal from
claims of hostile or harassing conditions of employment. 94 Plaintiffs have also resorted to filing
claims arising out of the employment relationship that sound in tort or breach of contract. 95 For
the most part, claims based on these theories have also been dismissed for reasons of church
autonomy. 96 Occasionally added to these unsuccessful common-law actions are a count under a
Our Lady, 140 S. Ct. at 2066.
See Demkovich v. Saint Andrew the Apostle Par., Calumet City, 3 F.4th 968 (7th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (holding
that the ministerial exception does apply to employment discrimination claim alleging hostile work environment or
sexual harassment); Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2010) (same). A
contrary result was reached in Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2004).
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exception, but not claims for breach of contract). The dean and member of the faculty was properly regarded as a
minister for purposes of the ministerial exception and the Christian college properly regarded as a religious entity.
The breach of contract claim was said to entail the litigation of only secular questions. But with defense of church
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state whistleblower statute, also unsuccessful. 97 The dismissals are proper. 98 What ought to
matter concerning the applicability of the ministerial exception is not legal counsel for plaintiffs
selecting just the right civil writ to pursue an employment grievance—be it the law of torts,
contracts, property, or implied trust. That sort of 19th century, writ-bound thinking has long been
abandoned in the law of pleading and preclusion, and it has no place in the First Amendment. As
a defense of constitutional scope, church autonomy necessarily bars these tort and contract suits
if proving the elements of the prima facie claim (or various expected defenses) would give rise to
questions that intrude into the employer’s internal governance, including the determination of
doctrine or polity, the prudent supervision of ministers, the dismissal of members and affiliates,
or internal communications about these matters.
Not every tort, contract, or whistleblower claim arising out of an employment
relationship involving a religious employer will be barred by church autonomy. 99 Rather, the
trial court should make findings concerning whether entertaining a common-law claim will
invade one of the five protected subject matters that the Supreme Court has deemed out-ofbounds to civil authorities as a matter of internal governance.
B. “The Law Knows No Heresy”: The Rule Against Deciding Religious Questions
Church autonomy doctrine has long entailed the rule that the judiciary must avoid issues
that cause it to probe into the religious meaning of religious words, practices, or events, 100 and
retirement); Kaufman v. Sheehan, 707 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that employment suit by priest filed under
theory of breach of employment contract was subject to First Amendment ministerial exception); Erdman v. Chapel
Hill Presbyterian Church, 286 P.3d 357 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (rejecting “neutral principles of law” exception to
church autonomy in state tort claim related to ministerial employment).
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See Rehfield, 2021 IL 125656 (dismissing whistleblower claim by former ministerial employee filed along with
statutory civil rights counts alleging employment discrimination); Simon, 2021 WL 1660851 (citing ministerial
exception as reason to dismiss claims for employment discrimination and whistleblowing brought by individual who
was chair of religion department and campus chaplain at Catholic college).
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that it must avoid making determinations concerning the centrality of a religious belief or
practice to that religion. 101 Often referred to as the “religious question doctrine,” the rule bars the
judiciary—indeed all civil officials and authorities—from attempting to resolve disputes over the
orthodoxy of what a person or organization professes, and from taking up any question as to the
validity, meaning, or importance of a religious belief or practice. To the law it makes no
difference if a religious liberty claimant is uncertain about or questioning her beliefs, if she is a
new convert, or if she is not a part of any organized church or denomination. 102 As the Court
pronounced in Watson, “The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma,
the establishment of no sect.” 103 The purpose of the rule is to keep the government from picking
sides concerning a religious matter—a purpose rooted in the Establishment Clause—as well as to
not deter a person’s free exercise of religion.
The most frequently cited case for the rule is Thomas v. Review Board. 104 In Thomas, a
state sought to defeat a former employee’s Free Exercise Clause claim challenging the
government’s denial of unemployment compensation. Thomas was laid off from a factory when
he refused to work on parts for military tanks because he was a religious pacifist. By using the

function or competence to resolve religious differences); Gillette v. U.S., 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971) (Congress
permitted to accommodate “all war” but not “just war” pacifists because to broaden the exemption invites increased
church-state entanglements and would render almost impossible the fair and uniform administration of selective
service system); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (courts should avoid entanglement that would
follow should tax authorities evaluate the temporal worth of religious social welfare programs); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305-07 (1940) (ruling that petty officials may not to be given discretion to determine
what is a legitimate “religion” for purposes of issuing permit); see also Rusk v. Espinosa, 456 U.S. 951 (1982) (aff’d
mem.) (striking down charitable solicitation ordinance that required government officials to distinguish between
“spiritual” and secular purposes underlying solicitation by religious organizations).
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See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988) (rejecting free exercise test
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States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (rejecting government’s argument that free exercise claim does not lie
unless “payment of social security taxes will . . . threaten the integrity of the Amish religious belief or observance”);
Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87 (same).
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See Frazee v. Illinois Dep’t of Empl. Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (state could not withhold unemployment
compensation from Sabbath observer because he was not a member of any church).
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testimony of a co-worker, who was also a longtime member of the same religion as Thomas, the
state sought to show that Thomas, as a new convert, was misapplying the teachings of his
church. The Supreme Court would have none of it, observing that Thomas “drew a line”
concerning his beliefs that the state had to accept, lest the civil courts become “arbiters of
scriptural interpretation.” 105
Thomas was a cause of action brought by an individual religious claimant rather than a
lawsuit attempting to vindicate the autonomy of a church. Thus, it might seem odd to regard the
precedent as a leading case for the application of church autonomy. The main underlying cause
of action was about whether Thomas had a successful entitlement claim under the Free Exercise
Clause, which the Court eventually held that he did. However, application of the church
autonomy doctrine in Thomas arose out of an ancillary issue—whether the state’s expert
testimony went to a religious question the Court could not properly consider.
The prohibition on civil courts taking up religious issues or disputes frequently is an
important reason for rejecting an argument raised by a party opposing a religious claimant. For
example, in Our Lady the teachers in the Catholic elementary schools argued that they could not
be ministers for purposes of the ministerial exception unless as a condition of employment they
were required to be Catholic, like the sponsoring schools. The Court rejected the suggestion
because civil judges cannot determine when an employee is a co-religionist with the employer. Is
an Orthodox Jew a co-religionist with a Conservative Jewish employer? Is a Southern Baptist
teacher seeking employment at a Primitive Baptist school applying to work for a co-religionist?
For a civil magistrate to have the final say as to who is a co-religionist to the employer violates
the ban on religious questions. 106 Our Lady further rejected the co-religionist criterion because a
civil court would have no way of independently determining whether an employee remained in
good standing with her church (thus still a co-religionist) without transgressing the rule against
religious questions. Is a teacher who says she is Catholic to be regarded by a court as a Catholic
in good standing when she attends mass only on Easter and Christmas and favors women’s
reproductive rights? 107

450 U.S. at 715, 716. Thomas was a Jehovah’s Witness. He believed his religion prohibited him from working in
a factory on the task of fabricating turrets for military tanks. Id. at 710.
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The Court rejected a similar line of argument in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 108
where the government opposed application of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 109 to the
“contraceptive mandate” for employers subject to the Affordable Care Act. Government lawyers
argued that the complicity in evil-doing claimed by Hobby Lobby as a result of the contraceptive
mandate was too attenuated to constitute a substantial religious burden. The Court rejected the
government’s attenuation argument because a civil court would have no way of determining if
the employer’s claim of complicity in evil-doing was central or peripheral to the employer’s
religious faith without violating the rule prohibiting religious questions. 110
In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 111 the rule prohibiting religious questions helped
to prevent a religious K-12 school from being subjected to mandatory collective bargaining
under the National Labor Relations Act. 112 The Court painted a picture of church-state
entanglements that could arise if ecclesiastical authorities operating a school were forced to
answer to charges of unfair labor practices. 113 The specter was of a bishop or mother superior
being harshly examined by an administrative law judge concerning his or her truthfulness when
characterizing as religious the educational policy being challenged by the union representing lay
teachers. This is another way of saying that government-supervised collective bargaining would
frequently call for the administrative resolution of religious disputes. The NLRA had no statutory
exemption for religious organizations, including religious schools. Yet by adopting a rule of
statutory construction that presumes religious organizations are exempt from congressional
regulatory statutes that would otherwise entangle the government in matters of internal religious
governance, the Court held that the NLRA did not apply to these schools. 114 The result is best
explained by the church autonomy doctrine.
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Similarly, some tort claims against a church necessarily raise forbidden religious
questions for resolution by the finder of fact, often a jury. 115 Perhaps the most novel line of tort
claims to be impacted by church autonomy doctrine is the bitter struggle surrounding the theory
of clergy malpractice. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley concerned the
relationship between a local church and one of its members. 116 For several years, Kenneth Nally
regularly attended worship services at Grace Community Church, a nondenominational
Protestant congregation, and was involved in additional midweek church activities. He willingly
sought spiritual counseling by the pastoral staff that was provided at no cost. Kenneth had long
suffered from depression, and in 1979, he committed suicide at the age of 24. The following
year, his parents filed a wrongful death suit against the church and four members of the pastoral
staff. The complaint alleged three theories of relief: clergy malpractice in pastoral counseling and
teaching; negligence in the training of the pastoral staff to perform the spiritual counseling; and
outrageous conduct in allegedly dissuading Kenneth from turning to his family and their Catholic
upbringing to address his depression and suicidal tendencies. After protracted discovery and
pretrial motions, the case was dismissed by the trial court citing uncontested facts that
undermined central allegations in the parents’ pleading, but also by relying on First Amendment
safeguards for church operations. The California Court of Appeal, in a split decision, reversed
and remanded for further discovery and trial. 117
On remand and three weeks into a trial before a jury, the judge granted defendants’
motion for a nonsuit on all three counts in the complaint. 118 The claims were dismissed for both
factual and legal reasons, one prominent rationale being the defenses available under the First
Amendment. 119 Nally’s parents again appealed, and the Court of Appeal again reversed. It held
that although the clergy malpractice count failed to state a cause of action separate from the
negligence count, both legal theories could be construed as stating a cause of action for the
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“negligent failure to prevent suicide” by the church’s “non-therapist counselors.” The First
Amendment defenses were brushed aside.
On review by the California Supreme Court, it held that the trial court had correctly
granted a nonsuit as to all three counts in the complaint. 120 The high court thought that neither
the evidence adduced at trial nor well-established principles of tort law supported the Court of
Appeal’s reversal of the nonsuit. The holding was based on the facts and state tort law.
Accordingly, the California Supreme Court said it need not address the First Amendment issues
raised by the church and its four pastors. A final appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court was
summarily turned away, 121 a result virtually assured because final disposition by the state
supreme court was grounded in state law, not federal First Amendment issues.
At one level, the church and its pastoral staff were vindicated as the dispute ended
entirely in their favor. But the basis for that resolution was not entirely satisfactory because the
appellate courts lost an opportunity for a valuable teaching on the First Amendment.
Nevertheless, the ten-year struggle in California widely exposed and deeply tainted the theory of
clergy malpractice. As a consequence, when the theory was tried in other states, the courts
rejected it—this time, for the right reason. 122 A claim for clergy malpractice assumes a uniform
and regulated profession with objective, temporal standards of care against which an alleged
failure of legal duty can be measured. That is not possible when the offices of clergy are as
differentiated as those of rabbi, priest, pastor, and imam. Accordingly, the plaintiffs sought to
have the law of torts impose a uniform standard of care on all clergy, as is the case with suits for
medical, legal, and other types of malpractice. But for a common-law judge to impose a uniform
standard of clerical practice is an obvious form of religious establishment—choosing one set of
religious practices over others. The claim of ordinary negligence fares no better. In litigating the
duty of due care or asking what constitutes “the reasonably prudent cleric,” a civil court—often
with a jury as fact finder—will find itself probing the spiritual duties of an ecclesiastical office
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and facing differing (sometimes conflicting) interpretations of scripture, doctrine, and religious
tradition. This violates the prohibition on civil authorities resolving religious questions. Further,
such findings—even assuming they can be established on a case-by-case basis—will yield a
standard of care that varies from church to church. To avoid this conclusion, the plaintiffs in
Nally sought to import secular standards from the profession of clinical licensed counselors.
However, not only were these secular standards an alien imposition on the office of clerics
attuned to providing spiritual advice, but the secular principles and methods could conflict with
the church’s teachings—a free exercise burden.
Over time, the rule prohibiting a state from resolving religious disputes has become
identified with what judges and lawyers refer to when they caution the government against
untoward “entanglements” between church and state. The same concept is behind the judicial
praise offered for legislative or regulatory exemptions that thereby successfully avoid such
entanglements. It was in Walz v. Tax Commission of New York that the Supreme Court first sang
the virtues of avoiding entanglement between the institutions of church and state. 123 The Walz
Court considered a property tax exemption for churches, which it not only found to be
compatible with the Establishment Clause, 124 but praiseworthy because it avoided administrative
entanglements otherwise present in the property appraisals, tax liens, and tax foreclosures that
attend ad valorem statutes. 125 Just one year later, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court fashioned a
wholly new requirement that governments eschew “excessive entanglement” between church and
state to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. 126 However, in a complex society, a certain
level of regulatory interaction between church and state is inevitable, even desirable. For
example, churches can hardly be exempt from building safety codes or most zoning restrictions.
While the three-part Lemon test is now in disuse, 127 for a time there were cases where
administrative entanglement alone—deemed to be excessive by some measure never

397 U.S. 664.
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quantified—could lead to laws being deemed unconstitutional. 128 That unhappy state of affairs
seems to have gotten sorted out, and excessive entanglement is no longer found to be a standalone violation of the Establishment Clause. 129 The idea that regulatory entanglements can
independently implicate the Establishment Clause has now been narrowed and subsumed into the
longstanding rule prohibiting courts from answering religious questions. And it is all to the better
that the word “entanglement” has been repurposed in this way. Judges and lawyers can still refer
to unconstitutional entanglements (dropping the adjective “excessive”) as a descriptor for when a
church-state boundary has been crossed, but it is now just a succinct way of describing a failure
by civil officials to heed the rule against taking up religious questions.
The rule prohibiting religious questions does not forbid government authorities from
inquiring into the sincerity of a party asserting a claim or defense of religious freedom. 130 As
difficult as it can be to measure what is in the hearts of people with respect to their religious
professions, requiring sincerity is a logical necessity. The Religion Clauses must not be allowed
to become a refuge for fakers, frauds, and charlatans. That said, sincerity is rarely an issue in
First Amendment claims. In most every case, the government tacitly concedes the claimant’s
sincerity, but then defends the suit on other grounds.
The scope of the religious question rule also leaves room for the government to make
limited inquiries about a religion. At its most elemental level, this is the government simply
taking notice that an entity identifies as Catholic rather than Protestant, or that an entity is a freestanding religious college rather than a subsidiary of a Protestant denomination. These are factual
findings that merely take note of a given religion’s beliefs or polity. For example, a civil
magistrate, following the usual rules of evidence, can determine whether a Jewish community
center or a Christian international disaster relief organization is a religious employer such that it
qualifies for an exemption from federal employment antidiscrimination laws. 131 It is no invasion
of church autonomy to ask an employer, claiming to be statutorily exempt because it is religious,
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to demonstrate that it is organized under state law as a religious corporation, that it continues to
hold itself out to the public as such, and that it presently engages in religious activities. Such
findings of fact are permitted because they are inquiries about religion, not about the underlying
religion’s validity or the religious meaning or importance of its tenets and observances.
C. Internecine Disputes, Including Litigation Implicating Only Title to Church Property
The third type of frequently occurring litigation implicating the church autonomy
doctrine is disputes between two factions within a religious organization as to which is the “true”
church. 132 To begin, the civil courts cannot adjudicate which faction has departed from the
“correct” doctrine or polity and thus should be denied the organization’s property, for that is a
prohibited religious question. This would seem to mean that any dispute over the use or
ownership of church property must be left for resolution by the internal dispute resolution
processes of the church. And it remains for the civil authorities to step back and defer to the final
result of those internal processes. 133 That is indeed the general rule as dictated by church
autonomy. In a church of hierarchical polity, the officials at the top are likely to prevail, as we
see in the leading case of Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich. 134 In contrast, in a
church body of congregational polity, the majority of local voting members will decide the
matter in question.
In its line of cases involving internecine disputes, however, the Supreme Court has
developed an alternative where state authorities resolve the conflict over title to the disputed
property through state-fashioned “neutral principles of law.” It bears special caution that
resorting to a rule of neutral principles has been permitted only when the disputing factions have
abandoned any attempt to remain together as a unified religious entity, leaving for civil
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resolution only the issue of which faction is to be awarded ownership of the church property. The
Court has not overtly announced this limitation on the rule, but it is the most straightforward way
to reconcile the High Court’s cases—and it does the least damage to the doctrine of church
autonomy. There will follow more discussion on why the neutral-principles alternative is
permitted in these limited circumstances, but we begin with the general rule.
The first in this internecine dispute line of cases is Watson v. Jones. 135 The Supreme
Court in Watson laid down the broad principles that apply when federal courts deal with disputes
within a religious body that implicate doctrine, polity, oversight of ecclesiastics, or the discipline
of members. To avoid transgressing church autonomy, civil magistrates defer to the dispute
resolution reached by the church’s highest judicatory:
[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or
law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the
matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and
as binding on them, in their application to the case before them. 136
Watson was a post-Civil War case that involved a struggle in Kentucky between two factions of
a local Presbyterian church for control of the church building. Title as set forth in the deed to the
property was in the name of the trustees of the local church. However, the corporate charter of
the local church “subjected both property and trustees alike to the operation of [the general
church’s] fundamental laws.” 137 The general church or denomination was the Presbyterian
Church of the United States. Its highest governing body was called the General Assembly. The
internal operational rules governing the General Assembly stated that it possessed “the power of
deciding in all controversies respecting doctrine and discipline.” 138
Following the Civil War, the General Assembly had ordered members of all local church
bodies who believed in a divine basis for slavery to “repent and forsake these sins.” 139 In
Kentucky, a majority of local church members were willing to comply with the directive. A
minority faction, however, dissented, and it deemed the directive of the Assembly a departure
from the doctrine held at the time when the local church body first joined with the general
80 U.S. 679.
Id. at 727.
137
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church. The minority’s legal theory was that the general church held an interest in the local real
estate that was subject to an implied trust. Further, a condition of the trust was that the church
adhere to its original doctrines. Any material departure by the general church meant a breach of
the trust and thus forfeiture of its interest in the property. Accordingly, the minority faction
claimed that the majority had relinquished any right to ownership of the property when the
general church repudiated the original, proslavery doctrines. Because they were the “true
church,” members of the minority faction maintained, they should be awarded title to the local
real estate. 140
The Supreme Court began by rejecting the implied-trust theory—which originated in
English law with its established Church of England 141—because the departure-from-doctrine
inquiry would require civil adjudication of a religious question. The Watson Court gave three
reasons for why it did not have authority to pass judgment on that question: (1) civil judges are
unschooled in religious doctrine and thereby not competent to resolve disputes concerning
religious doctrine nor to properly interpret church documents and canon law; 142 (2) for the civil
law to award the property to the faction adhering to original doctrine would entail the
government taking sides in a religious dispute, thereby “establishing” one creedal position over
another, while also inhibiting forces for reform in religious doctrine; 143 and (3) both clerics and
lay members of a church have voluntarily joined the entire church, the general as well as the
local body, thus giving implied consent to the polity of the entire church and its canonical
administration of disputes. 144 These bases for church autonomy are rooted, said the Court, in
the American governmental system that—unlike the English system—separates the
institutions of church and state, thereby sharply limiting the involvement of civil courts in
the governance of religious bodies. 145
Id. at 691-94.
Id. at 727-28.
142
Id. at 729, 730, 732.
143
Id. at 728, 730, 732.
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less democratic, with the final say on most matters lying with the diocesan bishop. In contrast to these hierarchical
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entity. In such a polity, a majority of the local members resolves disputes in accord with a set of bylaws, hence most
differences can be settled democratically once a meeting is called, a quorum is present, and bona fide members cast
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The Supreme Court went on to hol d that a local member’s implied consent to be
governed by the general church’s polity and its officials is sufficient to protect that
individual’s free-exercise rights, so long as the member has the unilat eral right to leave the
church at any time. 146 Departing from a church, of course, means a cleric or church member
leaving behind his or her work and ministry, both spiritual and material. But being willing to
leave behind one’s p a s t works is what is impliedly consented to when one voluntarily joins
both the church-wide units and a local congregation of a denomination.
Watson was followed by Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop. 147 The issue in
Gonzalez arose in the Philippines, a U.S. territory at the time, hence there was federal subject
matter jurisdiction. A dispute arose in the Catholic Church over the authority to fill a clerical
vacancy. The Supreme Court brushed aside a contrary result based on a rule found in the civil
law and instead deferred to the church’s power of appointment resting in the archbishop.
The Watson and Gonzalez principles were elevated to First Amendment stature in
Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral. 148 The Supreme Court in Kedroff struck down a New
York statute that had recently been adopted to move control of domestic Russian Orthodox
Churches from the central governing hierarchy located in the Soviet Union to the Diocese of
North America. The state’s felt need to transfer control of ecclesiastical authority was linked to
the Marxist Revolution of 1917 and subsequent doubt concerning whether there was in the
U.S.S.R. “a true central organization of the Russian Orthodox Church capable of functioning as
the head of a free international religious body.” 149 This was the height of the Cold War, and the
state legislature believed that church officials in Moscow had been coopted by the Communist
Party. Because the New York statute did more than just “permit the trustees of the Cathedral [in
New York City] to use it for services consistent with the desires of the [local] members”—but
transferring control over the denomination’s North American churches by legislative fiat 150—the
Supreme Court held that the statute violated the “rule of separation between church and

episcopal, presbyterian, or congregational, it must be remembered that this typology is an approximation only. In a
given case, there are any number of variations along a sliding scale of governance systems. And this is even more so
once courts are confronted with religious polities outside of Christianity.
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state.” 151
The Watson Court had repudiated the English implied-trust rule and its departure-fromdoctrine standard in 1872, but only as a matter of federal common law. 152 For well over half a
century, a number of American states continued to follow the English implied-trust rule as a
matter of their own common law. Kedroff, however, clearly foreshadowed the sweeping aside
of the common law in those states still following the English rule. 153
In Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Church, 154 the Supreme
Court confirmed that Kedroff had elevated the principles of church autonomy such that they are
required by the First Amendment. 155 Presbyterian Church involved a doctrinal dispute
between a general church and two of its local Georgia congregations. The congregations
sought to leave the denomination and take with them the local property. The locals claimed
that the general church had violated the organization’s constitution and had departed from
original doctrine with respect to biblical teaching on particular social issues. 156 At the time,
Georgia still followed the implied-trust rule with its requisite fact-finding into alleged
departures from doctrine. The rule required the state trial court to ask two religious
questions: (1) What were the tenets of the general church at the time the local congregations
first affiliated? (2) Had the general church departed substantially from one or more of these
doctrines? On the basis of a jury finding that the general church had abandoned its original
doctrines, the Georgia courts entered judgment awarding the property to the local
congregations. On review, the U.S. Supreme Court again held that the First Amendment did
not permit a departure-from-doctrine standard as a substantive rule of decision. The
“American concept of the relationship between church and state,” 157 the Court said, “leaves
the civil court no role in determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving
Id. at 110.
In Watson, the federal trial court had diversity jurisdiction. The rule of decision was based on federal
common law rather than the First Amendment. This is because Watson was decided prior to Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In following the old rule of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), federal
courts sitting in diversity could deviate from state substantive law. Moreover, the First Amendment Religion
Clauses had not yet been applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
153
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property disputes.” 158 Justice William Brennan, writing for a unanimous Court, went on to
observe in dicta another path forward other than Watson’s rule of judicial deference. He
wrote that civil courts could resolve disputes that concerned title to church property
provided they follow “neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes”
of this sort. 159 The opinion did not further define or elaborate on what those neutral
principles of property law might be. Principles will vary state to state. But whatever the
principles chosen, they could not displace the rule prohibiting a civil magistrate from taking
up religious questions.
The invocation of neutral principles in Presbyterian Church unsettled a century of law
with its genesis in Watson. For some, Presbyterian Church was even mistakenly understood as
replacing altogether the rule of judicial deference. A year later, the Court granted plenary
review in Maryland & Va. Churches of God v. Church at Sharpsburg, another case involving a
dispute over title—and just over title—to local church property in a dispute between two
local churches, on the one hand, and general church authorities on the other. 160 Once again,
the local congregations sought to leave the denomination while retaining the local property.
In an unsigned opinion, the Supreme Court approved of the Maryland courts applying state
legislation
governing the holding of property by religious corporations, upon language in
the deeds conveying the properties in question to the local church corporations,
upon the terms of the charters of the corporations, and upon provisions in the
constitution of the General Eldership pertinent to the ownership and control of
church property. 161
This was the state’s version of neutral principles, and the Supreme Court held it was an
acceptable alternative for resolving the question via what Justice Brennan, concurring,
termed the “formal title doctrine.” 162 To be “neutral,” the alternative to judicial deference
had to be applicable to all property disputes of a like sort, be the organization secular or
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religious. Church documents could be examined to a degree, 163 but only through a secular
lens: “Only express conditions [in a church document] that may be effected without
consideration of [religious] doctrine are civilly enforceable” by a civil magistrate. 164 At the very
least, this is a sensitive task in which it is easy to err, a weakness in the neutral-principles
approach.
There was a danger that the neutral-principles option briefly mentioned in
Presbyterian Church and applied in Church at Sharpsburg would be overread to apply to all
religious disputes, not just formal title disputes. Hence, the Supreme Court’s ruling seven
years later in Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich 165 was corrective, a return to the
basics: the general rule was still judicial deference to internal church authorities, and neutral
principles would be permitted only when the sole issue for civil resolution was title to the
local property.
In Milivojevich, the Court—following the rule of judicial deference—rejected an
Illinois bishop’s lawsuit challenging a top-down reorganization of the American-Canadian
Diocese of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church and his removal from office. The Supreme
Court determined that the dispute over internal church administration and a clerical
appointment were insulated from civil review under the First Amendment. 166 There was no
dispute that the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church was hierarchical and that the sole power to
remove clerics rested with the ecclesiastical body in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, that already had
decided the North American bishop’s case. 167 Nor was there any question that the matters at
issue were at heart a religious dispute. 168 Nevertheless, the state court had decided in favor of the
defrocked bishop because, in its view, the church’s adjudicatory procedures were applied in an
arbitrary manner. On review, the Supreme Court rejected an “arbitrariness” exception to the
judicial-deference rule when the question before the civil courts concerned church polity or
supervision of a bishop. 169 To accept authority over such a subject is not “consistent with the

Id. at 369 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power
within a church so as to decide where religious law places control over the use of church property would violate the
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constitutional mandate [that] the civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest
judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith,
internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.” 170 The civil courts may not even
examine whether the church judicatory properly followed its own rules of procedure. 171
Using reasoning similar to that in Watson, the Milivojevich Court explained that there are
three practical bases for the First Amendment prohibition on civil court authority in church
matters. First, civil courts cannot delve into ambiguities in canon law or church documents. 172
These matters are too sensitive to permit any civil probing because such inquiries may prove
intrusive and entail the court taking sides in a religious dispute. 173 Second, civil judges have no
training in canon law and theological interpretation and thus are not competent to judge such
matters. 174 Third, the “[c]onstitutional concepts of due process, involving secular notions of
‘fundamental fairness,’” cannot be borrowed from American civil law and grafted onto a
church’s polity to somehow modernize the rules followed by church judicatories. 175 The
Supreme Court also reversed the state court’s unraveling of the diocesan reorganization, holding
that the Illinois court had impermissibly “delved into the various church constitutional
provisions” relevant to “a matter of internal church government, an issue at the core of
ecclesiastical affairs.” 176 The enforcement of church documents, often unclear to a civil judge,
cannot be accomplished “without engaging in a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry
into church polity.” 177
In Milivojevich, there is no mention of neutral principles of law. Going forward, the
disputing parties intended to remain as one church. So it appears that in such a circumstance,
the rule of judicial deference is the only option. In contrast, in both Presbyterian Church and
Church at Sharpsburg, going forward the disputing parties had no intention to remain as one
170
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church. That being so, the sole remaining issue for the civil courts to consider was formal
title. In the mind of the Court, only then is neutral principles a workable option. 178
The next and final case in this line of internecine contests is unlike Milivojevich but
like Presbyterian Church and Church at Sharpsburg. In Jones v. Wolf, the Supreme Court
again said that state courts may, in limited instances, devise neutral principles of law to
adjudicate intrachurch disputes over formal title to property. 179 Courts may examine church
charters, constitutions, deeds, and trust indentures to resolve property disputes using
“objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and
judges.” 180 Courts can look to state corporation and property laws. To a limited extent, they may
even “examine certain religious documents, such as a church constitution, for language of trust in
favor of the general church.” 181 The method’s advantage is that it sometimes “obviates
entirely the need for an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or doctrine in settling
church property disputes . . . .” 182 It serves the state’s interests in providing a forum for
peaceful dispute resolution and quieting title to real property. 183 Wolf approved of neutral
principles of law as a permissible alternative to judicial deference, but Milivojevich is still good
law. So it would seem that Wolf is contingent on the sole dispute before the magistrate being
formal title. In such cases, it is up to the high court in each state to choose which rule to follow:
deference or neutral principles. But the Supreme Court added the following caution to courts
when using neutral principles:
[T]here may be cases where the deed, the corporate charter, or the constitution of
the general church incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating to the
ownership of property. In such a case, if the interpretation of the instruments of
ownership would require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the
court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative

See Hutchison v. Thomas, 789 F.2d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 1986) (neutral-principles rule was “simply not applicable”
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ecclesiastical body. 184
Thus, in applying neutral principles the judge may examine church documents, if at all, only
through a secular lens. The documents, if ambiguous or otherwise in need of interpretation, do
not authorize the judge to resolve a religious question or dispute. 185
When a church’s polity is hierarchal and the dispute arises where the local church (or
the majority faction thereof) wants to leave the general church, a rule of judicial deference
will nearly always mean that the general church prevails in the dispute. And if the dispute is
over title to property, the general church will likely be awarded title. The rule of deference
postulates that this is fair because when the local members first joined the church, they
impliedly consented to such top-down rule. In most instances, however, the local members
gave the matter no thought. Further, it is the local members who typically donated the
money to acquire the local property and maintain it down through the years. And it does not
help the equities of the case that the officials governing the general church are often located
in some other state, whereas the unhappy laity reside in the forum state and are pleading
with their state officials to consider what is fair. A rule of neutral principles gives a state
court the option to redefine fairness by requiring that title to local church property be treated
in the same manner as title disputes to property held by other voluntary associations.
The downside to neutral principles is that there is a departure from the doctrine of
church autonomy where a general church’s hierarchical polity is ignored. But this downside
is ameliorated somewhat because the general church administrators of hierarchical polity can
arrange in advance the local church’s documents so that the general church prevails if a dispute
arises. Officials in the general church probably have greater legal sophistication, and they know
from experience the sort of things that can go wrong. And it is at this early point in time when
the relationship between general and local is most amiable and full of optimism for the future.
Further, the Supreme Court has offered neutral principles as an option, rather than requiring
it, so the high court in each state may choose to retain the rule of judicial deference across
Id. at 604. See also id. at 602 (“the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may
play in resolving church property disputes”).
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all disputes. Finally, should a state retain the rule of judicial deference in all instances,
disappointed members of a rebelling local church always retain their constitutional right of
departure. True, in leaving their church, the disgruntled local members leave behind their
past material contributions and affections connected to a particular building. But they have a
constitutionally protected right to leave and start afresh a new church or join another
fellowship across town more compatible with their spiritual beliefs.
As a deviation from church autonomy doctrine, a rule of neutral principles still remains
questionable. The 5-4 split in Wolf is demonstrative. While the rule of neutral principles is
supposed to be “neutral,” most often it will favor the local church faction. That is the faction
likely favored by state officials as they respond to petitions from their local constituents.
Importantly, in all other types of internecine disputes the Court has resolved the matter by
following a rule of judicial deference. There can be no resort to neutral principles in cases such
as Milivojevich, Kreshik, Kedroff, and Gonzalez where the disputes are over doctrine or the
selection of clerical leaders, as opposed to merely the monetary value of land and a building
where worship takes place. 186
A danger is that neutral principles can spill over into other areas and contaminate the law.
We see this with the law of defamation. However, any doubt as to whether the U.S. Supreme
Court would extend the neutral-principles option beyond property disputes between separating
factions was resolved with its unanimous decision in Hosanna-Tabor. Hosanna-Tabor was about
personnel, as was Our Lady. When the employer is a church, personnel is policy. There was not
a single mention of neutral principles in Hosanna-Tabor or Our Lady, putting them at odds with
any prospect of a wider use of neutral principles.
D. Defamation Claims Against a Church or Its Officials
The Court in Our Lady said the ministerial exception “does not mean that religious
institutions enjoy a general immunity from secular laws, but it does protect their autonomy with
respect to internal management decisions that are essential to the institution’s central
mission.” 187 And in Hosanna-Tabor, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the Court:
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Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars [antidiscrimination civil
rights claims]. We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of
suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious
conduct by their religious employers. There will be time enough to address the
applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise. 188
A number of such common-law claims have arisen, often brought by plaintiffs seeking to
get around the ministerial exception. They urge judges to ask the wrong question: Can neutral
principles apply? The results have been conflicting, but the confusion is entirely unnecessary.
The proper question to determine whether church autonomy is a valid defense comes right out of
Hosanna-Tabor: Is this a matter of internal governance? If so, we have a zone free of
government interference. Again, the five subjects of internal governance are: (1) the
determination of doctrine, including the validity, importance, or meaning of a religious question;
(2) the determination of the organization’s polity; (3) the hiring, training, promotion, or dismissal
of clerics, ministers, and other religious functionaries and leaders; (4) the admission and
dismissal of members, as well as a determination of whether their affiliation is in good standing;
and (5) internal communications by church officials and members concerning the foregoing four
subject matters. If the prosecution of a claim of defamation falls in one or more of these five
zones, the action is categorically barred.
There are more than a few defamation cases in the lower state and federal courts that ask
if the matter can be resolved by applying neutral principles. 189 This shows a fundamental
misunderstanding of the doctrine of church autonomy. The Supreme Court has allowed neutral
principles only in internecine disputes over church property, and only then when the sole
disputed issue is formal title. The question to ask is whether a plaintiff can prove the elements of
defamation without invading any of the five protected areas of internal governance, then church
565 U.S. at 196.
See Diocese of Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d at 526-35 (Boyd, J., dissenting) (collecting lower court cases applying
neutral principles to adjudicate defamation claims against churches). Many of these collected cases permit a claim to
proceed if the allegedly defamatory remark was made to the public and away from church property. These are the
wrong parameters. The church autonomy defense applies if proving the elements of a defamation claim entangles
the court in one or more of the five subject matters previously identified by the Supreme Court as matters of
“internal governance.” There is nothing more to the defense. True, in looking into whether proper care was taken to
confine any communications about a disciplinary matter to those inside the church, it becomes relevant that the
alleged tortious remark got released to the public. But this does not entail applying neutral principles of law as an
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autonomy does not apply. 190 On the other hand, if proving the elements of the tort does invade
one or more of the five subject areas protected by church autonomy then the claim is
categorically barred. Borrowing the rubric of neutral principles from Church at Sharpsburg and
Wolf will surely introduce error. Some of the cases in the lower courts have gotten this matter
correct, 191 but others have missed the mark. 192
In still other defamation cases, plaintiff’s counsel points out that the allegedly libelous
statement is on a wholly secular topic, not a religious topic. 193 Once again, this shows a
fundamental misunderstanding of church autonomy. As noted in Hosanna-Tabor, church
autonomy extends to a religious entity’s entire zone of internal governance, to all matters strictly
ecclesiastical, whether the act of governance is characterized as religious or secular. Church
autonomy is a structural safeguard, not a right to be free from personal religious harm. It creates
a government-free zone that no supposedly “neutral principle” can invade. In Hosanna-Tabor,

As an example of a defamation claim that did not transgress the doctrine of church autonomy, see Ogle v.
Hocker, 279 Fed. Appx. 391 (6th Cir. 2008). Ogle, an evangelist and ordained cleric in a Protestant denomination,
brought claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Hocker, another ordained cleric
in the same denomination. Hocker was the pastor of a local church in the denomination, but Ogle was not on the
ministerial staff of that church or otherwise connected to it. The alleged torts arose from a Sunday sermon
illustration and later one-on-one conversations by Hocker in which he accused Ogle of homosexual advances
toward him when the two were on an overseas mission trip. Hocker raised the defense of church autonomy. The tort
claims did not involve a determination of doctrine or polity, nor were the remarks part of the denomination’s
selection or supervision of Ogle as a cleric. There were disciplinary proceedings by the denomination against Ogle.
However, Hocker’s local church had no jurisdiction as to the disciplinary actions involving Ogle, thus the remarks in
Hocker’s sermon had no part in Ogle’s discipline. Finally, the lawsuit was not based on a matter involving any
internal communications by officials in the denomination in the course of the disciplinary proceeding involving the
Ogle. Because a pursuit of the tort claims fell outside the five subject areas protected by church autonomy, the
appeals court was right to deny Hocker’s resort to the defense.
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the protected act of internal governance was to dismiss a teacher-minister for what would
normally pass for secular reasons—namely, the school’s retaliation for her invoking the
Americans with Disability Act. Counsel for the EEOC misunderstood the nature of the doctrine
of church autonomy when she told the Court that the school’s religious defense was pretextual,
that is, not really religious. The Court responded:
That suggestion misses the point of the ministerial exception. The purpose of the
exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision to fire a minister only when it is
made for a religious reason. The exception instead ensures that the authority to
select and control who will minster to the faithful—a matter “strictly
ecclesiastical,” . . . —is the church’s alone. 194
Counsel for the church may have additional defenses to the claim of defamation—such as
that the allegedly defamatory remark was true—which in turn may circle us back to the First
Amendment problem of whether the alleged truth or falsehood of a defamatory remark is a
prohibited religious question.
III.

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE TO PROPERLY ORDER THE TWO CENTERS OF AUTHORITY

The dichotomy between free-exercise rights and the doctrine of church autonomy has
many parallels to the dichotomy between constitutional rights and constitutional structure, and
these parallels illuminate the special procedures used in these cases that may otherwise be
puzzling. For example, as a defense the doctrine of church cannot be waived. Another such
special procedure is the initial limitation on discovery into the inner workings of a religious
organization lest a civil court’s entanglement with the entity’s internal affairs via document
demands, depositions, and the like generate a new violation of church autonomy. There is also
the collateral order doctrine permitting an interlocutory appeal from a denial of a motion to
dismiss or for summary judgment when a trial court rebuffs a ministerial exception defense. And
when the matter before the court is a church autonomy case, there is no balancing against the
government’s interests. Rather, there is an immediate dismissal, and the case is at an end.
The need for these special procedures comes about because the doctrine of church
autonomy involves a discrete zone of freedom for churches and other religious organizations. As
such, church autonomy is a structural restraint on the government’s power that creates breathing
space for religious organizations to go about matters of internal governance, whether those
194
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governance decisions are religiously motivated or secular. This is a carveout of a distinct area of
operations touching on doctrine, polity, and membership, as well as the selection, training, or
removal of the ministers that carry out central religious functions.
A. The Ministerial Exception: A Defense in the Nature of a Categorical Immunity
As with most matters concerning church autonomy, the best place to start is with the
Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Hosanna-Tabor. This was the Supreme Court’s first church
autonomy case since Wolf was decided in 1979, breaking a silence spanning a third of a century.
As discussed earlier, Hosanna-Tabor involved a fourth-grade teacher who sued her employer, a
church-related school, alleging retaliation for having asserted antidiscrimination rights under the
ADA. 195 The school raised as a defense the ministerial exception. The exception recognizes that
religious organizations have exclusive authority to select their own ministers—which necessarily
entails not just initial hiring but also promotion, training, supervision, retention, and other terms
and conditions of employment. 196 As a matter of First Amendment church autonomy, the
ministerial exception overrides not just the ADA, but a number of venerable employment
antidiscrimination statutes. 197
The Supreme Court observed that:
Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church
for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such
action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church
of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. 198
The Court said that although “the interest of society in the enforcement of employment
discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important . . . [,] so too is the interest of religious groups
in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission.” 199
Accordingly, in a lawsuit that strikes at the ability of the church to determine its leaders and
teachers, any balancing of interests between a vigorous eradication of employment
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discrimination, on the one hand, and institutional freedom, on the other hand, is a balance
already struck by the First Amendment on the side of church autonomy. 200
Church autonomy cases have been relatively few on the Court’s docket. But they are
powerful because once it is determined that the doctrine applies, no rejoinder is permitted by the
opposing party. That is, once it is determined that a lawsuit falls within one of the five subject
matters of internal church governance, there is no follow-on judicial balancing. The case is at an
end, and it remains only for a final judgment to be entered. 201 There is no balancing because
there can be no legally sufficient governmental interest to justify interfering in the internal
governance of a church. As the Court in Hosanna-Tabor intoned, the First Amendment has
already struck the balance. 202 In this regard, the Court criticized the EEOC’s rejoinder to the
Court’s case-ending conclusion that the ministerial exception applied. The EEOC asserted that
the school’s religious reason for firing Perich was pretextual. 203 “This suggestion misses the
point of the ministerial exception,” wrote the Chief Justice:
The purpose of the [ministerial] exception is not to safeguard a church’s decision
to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead
ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful—a
matter “strictly ecclesiastical,” . . . is the church’s alone. 204
Lower courts applying Hosanna-Tabor have rightly interpreted the ministerial exception,
not as a personal religious liberty but as a structural limitation on the government’s actions. 205
These cases are in large part rooted in the Establishment Clause, the text of which bespeaks a
structural negation of the government’s delegated powers: “Congress shall make no law” about a
discrete subject described as “an establishment of religion.” In disestablishing a church, the state
begins to separate and properly order relations between church and state. As Chief Justice
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Roberts wrote, “the Free Exercise Clause . . . protects a religious group’s right to shape its own
faith and mission” by controlling who are its ministers. A personal right of the church is
burdened when the church is coerced to employ an unwanted minister. But “the Establishment
Clause [also] prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.” 206 Here enters
the prohibition on the civil courts answering religious questions. The government acts beyond its
limited, delegated powers when it transgresses on the prerogative of a church which alone should
control the employment of its ministers. The Chief Justice gave examples of the English Crown
interfering with the appointment of clergy in the established Church of England. 207 He wrote that
the Establishment Clause was adopted in America over against the Church of England model and
to flatly deny such power to our newly formed national government. 208
There is a welcome absence of interest balancing in Hosanna-Tabor. Balancing tests are
still valid under the Free Exercise Clause when religion is targeted 209 or discriminated against. 210
But that is not the case when the subject matter warrants the categorical protection of what
Justice Alito in Our Lady called “religious autonomy.” 211 In the latter instance, the First
Amendment (understood against the backdrop of America’s state-by-state disestablishments that
broke with the Church of England model 212) has determined that hiring, promoting, supervising,
and dismissing ministers is a power reserved to the church alone—a power within the zone of
internal governance denied to Caesar.
B. Affirmative Defenses and Waivability
With reference to the ministerial exception, footnote 4 in Hosanna-Tabor noted that the
lower courts were divided over whether the exception is an affirmative defense or a matter that
goes to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The issue had not been briefed or argued by the
parties, but amici had touched on it. Without any analysis, the Supreme Court said in the
footnote that the ministerial exception was to be regarded as an affirmative defense. 213
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One way to understand footnote 4 is that the Chief Justice was passing judgment on
nothing more than a matter of civil pleading and practice. Hence, when there is a lawsuit that
might implicate the ministerial exception, as with any affirmative defense it is the responsibility
of the defendant to raise it in a pleading. 214 Because the allowance for amending a pleading is
quite liberal, 215 a waiver for failure to timely plead the defense will rarely occur. In lieu of a
responsive pleading, the defendant-church may initially raise the affirmative defense by a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 216 If additional materials are submitted in support of the
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, it becomes a motion for summary judgment. 217
The immediate difference as a result of the Court’s ruling in footnote 4 is slight. In
motions under Rule 12(b)(6), the defendant-church carries the burden of proof, whereas under
Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff would have the burden of convincing the trial court that it has subject
matter jurisdiction. As an evidentiary matter, this allocation of the burden of pleading makes
sense. When the key issue is whether the plaintiff in an employment discrimination suit is a
minister and works for an entity that is religious, much of the relevant information is in the hands
of the church. Thus, the church reasonably may be allocated the initial burden of producing
evidence. And should the evidence show that the plaintiff is a minister and works for an entity
that is religious, then the First Amendment requires that the trial court enter summary judgment
for the church and end the lawsuit. Any such judgment would be on the merits and grounded in
the First Amendment, not a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under Article III of the U.S.
Constitution or the jurisdictional granting statutes in title 28 of the U.S. Code. 218 It follows that
footnote 4 is not problematic if it is only about civil procedure. To be sure, sometimes buried in
the interstices of civil pleading and practice are deeper matters of consequence. 219 But it
overreads footnote 4 to make this one such instance. 220
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A difficulty arises in that as a general matter an affirmative defense is waived if not
timely raised by a defendant. 221 But the nature of the church autonomy doctrine is that it can
never be waived. This is because church autonomy is not a personal right, but is structural in
nature, keeping two centers of authority, church and state, in their right relationship. For
government to avoid violating an individual right is a matter of constitutional duty owed to each
person. On the other hand, for government to avoid exceeding a restraint imposed by the U.S.
Constitution’s structure is a duty owed to the entire body politic. Rights, because they are
personal, can be waived by the rights holder, whereas structure, because it is there to benefit the
entire body politic, cannot be waived by the named party defendant.
When constitutional structure delegates, separates, and limits governmental power, one
happy but indirect consequence of fidelity to that prescribed structure is the preservation of
individual liberty by avoiding concentrations of power. Church autonomy doctrine separates the
power of government and the authority of organized religion. And when the government cannot
invade a church’s zone of autonomy, individuals and the organizations they form might
experience a slight consequential increase in personal religious liberty. It is for this reason that
the doctrine of church autonomy registers in both the proper structuring of church-state relations
to protect the church with respect to its internal governance (the Establishment Clause), and also
in the safeguarding of the free exercise of the church (the Free Exercise Clause). 222 We need not
be puzzled that church autonomy is rooted in both Religion Clauses.
That church autonomy is nonwaivable can be consequential in multiple ways. For
example, a government benefit cannot be conditioned on the beneficiary waiving its mastery
over a matter of internal governance because the doctrine of church autonomy cannot be waived.
Indeed, because it is structural, church autonomy cannot be waived even when done so
knowingly and willingly by an intended beneficiary. A ready application, of course, is when the
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government attempts to attach “strings” to its funding programs. Such strings are ineffective
when up against a church autonomy defense.
Notwithstanding footnote 4, the idea that church autonomy is “jurisdictional” goes all the
way back to Watson v. Jones,

223

and the confusion of church autonomy being jurisdictional

rather than structural carries forward in the Court’s later cases. 224 While church autonomy is
structural, subject matter jurisdiction is also a matter of constitutional structure. This is where the
confusion may have started. But we now see that church autonomy is best understood as
structural, and that clears up the confusion.
Watson is not cited in Hosanna-Tabor footnote 4, thus no one can claim that the Chief
Justice was overruling the Court’s discussion of jurisdiction in Watson and later cases. Watson
was in federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, and the substantive law applied in the ruling
was federal general common law per Swift v. Tyson. 225 When Watson referred to “jurisdiction,” it
was likely not jurisdiction in the sense of the judicial authority conferred by Article III, clause 2
of the U.S. Constitution. Rather, the reference to jurisdiction was in the sense that the federal
government is one of limited, delegated powers, with the Religion Clauses negating any power in
Congress to make a law that regulates a church with respect to matters of internal governance.
As we have seen, that negation of power is structural with regard to church-government relations
and thus cannot be waived. 226 True, when the Court decided Watson—a diversity case
originating in Kentucky—the First Amendment did not apply to the states. But federal general
common law was about applying the better rule to a diversity case in federal court, and the better
rule was the one that acknowledged that the U.S. is a federalist republic of states with no
established religion, a nation that recognizes the mutually beneficial separation between
organized religion and government. That assessment was confirmed in Kedroff when the doctrine
223
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of church autonomy, via the First and Fourteenth Amendments, was explicitly applied to the
states. 227 Because church autonomy is derived from both Religion Clauses, and aspects of those
clauses are structural, church autonomy cannot be waived. This is what Kedroff accomplished,
and Hosanna-Tabor’s footnote 4 did not reverse Kedroff.
C. Limiting Discovery and Permitting Interlocutory Appeals
NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago was the first occasion for the Supreme Court to note
that the ministerial exception defense may call for limitations on civil discovery into the
operations of a church or similar religious organization. 228 Facing the prospect of federal officers
probing into allegations of unfair labor practices by religious officials at a primary and secondary
Catholic school, the Justices warned, “It is not only the conclusions that may be reached . . .
which may impinge on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but also the very process of
inquiry leading to findings and conclusions.” 229 Concurring in Hosanna-Tabor, Justices Alito
and Elena Kagan explained that “the mere adjudication of [religious] questions would pose grave
problems for religious autonomy.” 230 The lower courts have followed suit. For example, in
Whole Woman’s Health v. Smith, a trial court’s pretrial order compelling a faith-based crisis
pregnancy center to respond to discovery was reversed on appeal in part because discovery
would have revealed internal communications and otherwise interfered with the internal
decision-making processes of the ministry. 231 An interlocutory appeal was allowed on the
discovery issue because of the structural nature of the defense. 232 And while merits discovery
should be delayed in such cases, discovery concerning the affirmative defense itself is proper
(e.g., does plaintiff meet the definition of “minister”?). This is not to say that all merits discovery
should be delayed in every church autonomy case. Rather, the purpose of the limitation is to keep
the intrusion by civil discovery from generating a new invasion of the autonomy of the defendant
religious organization. Accordingly, the scope of a Rule 26(c) protective order should pertain to
the subject matters that concern the immunity: determinations of doctrine and polity; the
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admission and removal of members; the hiring, training, and removal of ministers and other
church leaders; and internal communications about all of the foregoing. 233
When a church has raised the ministerial exception by pleading or motion and the
affirmative defense has been denied by the trial court, the structural nature of church autonomy
calls for an interlocutory appeal. The requisites for interlocutory appeal under the collateral order
doctrine are that permitting an immediate appeal will conclusively settle the disputed issue, the
appeal would resolve an important issue separate from the merits, and the issue is effectively
unreviewable if the case is allowed to proceed to final judgment. 234 If the trial court is mistaken
in its ministerial exception ruling, to allow the case to continue to be prepared for trial and fully
tried on the merits is to reoffend the First Amendment with new church-state entanglements, and
to do so in a manner that can never be corrected on appeal. In other words, if discovery into the
merits goes forward this time a new harm of invading the church’s internal governance will be at
the hands of the trial court. And once that new harm is incurred under the coercion of a discovery
order, it cannot be redressed by the later payment of monetary damages (the court has absolute
immunity) or otherwise undone by later equitable relief. 235 Thus, an interlocutory appeal should
be allowed under the collateral order doctrine.
IV. TEXT, HISTORY, AND THE DOCTRINE OF CHURCH AUTONOMY
A. Reading the First Amendment Text
When the plain text is definitive, the courts need not resort to an interpretive rule, be it
originalist or otherwise. The First Amendment reads:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
Although it ends with a semicolon, the first clause would stand alone as a complete sentence.
And while there is but one clause addressing religious freedom, there are two participial phrases
(“respecting an establishment” and “prohibiting the free exercise”) modifying the object (“no
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law”) of the verb (“shall make”). It is therefore entirely proper to think in terms of two separate
disempowerments on the sentence’s subject (“Congress”). This is not to say that the two
restraints on power can never overlap. The government might transgress both participial
phrases—much like a single law might violate a person’s right to both free speech and due
process. However, notwithstanding an occasional overlap, the nonestablishment restraint and the
free-exercise restraint give rise to separate causes of action.
In closely observing the text, we see that the first participial phrase (“respecting an
establishment”) is different in nature from the amendment’s rights-based participial phrases
(“prohibiting the free exercise” and “abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press”). The
latter two forbid “prohibiting” and “abridging” and thus restrain the government with respect to a
person’s free exercise or free expression. These two phrases can be understood to acknowledge
that people have unalienable or natural rights to free exercise and free expression. They imply a
moral autonomy inherent to each individual rights-holder that the government does not have the
authority to easily overcome. On the other hand, the participial phrase “respecting an
establishment” is not about acknowledging an intrinsic right because of one’s humanity, but is a
reference to a discrete subject matter (“an establishment of religion”) that is being placed outside
(“no law”) of the government’s authority. This difference in participial phrases bespeaks a
difference in their function: acknowledging an intrinsic human right versus prohibiting the
government’s involvement in a discrete zone of activity.
As a matter of legal processes, a constitutional restraint on government involvement in a
particular subject matter requires structure. The Establishment Clause operates like a structural
distancing of two centers of authority: government and religion. Constitutional structure
delegates, separates, and limits power. A happy consequence of well-maintained constitutional
structure is the prevention of concentrations of power that can in turn lead to losses of personal
liberty. In the text of the Establishment Clause, we have a separation of the authority of
government and the authority of organized religion. All persons in a republic indirectly benefit
when the government cannot exercise power respecting “an establishment of religion.” An
individual complainant cannot waive this separation of powers any more than she can waive a
federal court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction (also a structural bar). Rather, the structural
separation is there to benefit more than just the complainant before the court. This is much like
the three-branch structuring we call “separation of powers”; the separation of the branches is
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there not just for the benefit of an individual complainant, but for all persons subject to the
Constitution.
Given the different natures of the Establishment Clause (structural) and the Free Exercise
and Free Speech Clauses (rights-based), the modern Supreme Court is correct when it applies the
Establishment Clause as a structural restraint that properly separates the two centers of authority
we call church and government. Stated differently, the Court envisions the Establishment Clause
as policing the boundary between church and government. It understands its judicial task as
keeping governmental power from entering a zone the subject matter of which is defined as “an
establishment of religion.” This is for the mutual good of the two things separated, church and
government. 236
The separation should not be exaggerated. This is a separation of the institutions of
religion from the institutions of the republic. While the institutions of church and government
can be separated, religion and politics cannot. Such a disjunction would rob believers and the
organizations they form of a freedom enjoyed by all others. Churches and other houses of
worship appropriately speak to how their teachings bear on social and political issues, all
consistent with their right to freedom of speech. 237
Regarding the Establishment Clause as structural explains several features in the church
autonomy case law. 238 For example, there are relaxed rules concerning standing to sue because in
lawsuits over structure there are often no parties with individualized harm. 239 Further, in contrast
to free-exercise claims that remedy only religious harms, the Establishment Clause provides a
remedy for nonreligious harms such as economic damages and loss of academic freedom. 240 This
also accounts for why federal courts sometimes frame the operation of the Establishment Clause
as a limit on their subject matter jurisdiction. 241 Whereas free-exercise lawsuits seek to yield a
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personal right that is subject to strict scrutiny, a prima facie Establishment Clause claim is not
subject to a balancing test that weighs governmental interests against a claimant’s right. Either
the Establishment Clause is violated or it is not—no balancing. This begins to explain why both
the prohibition on courts answering religious questions and the ministerial exception are
substantially rooted in the no-establishment principle, as befits rules that derive from church
autonomy.
The plain text of the First Amendment takes us a long way toward explaining the reach
and limits of the doctrine of church autonomy. But it can take us only so far. The text does not
tell us what the founders meant by “an establishment of religion.” Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady
teach us that this calls for a turn to history, in particular a rejection of the Church of England
model at the time of America’s founding.
B. History as a Backdrop to Church Autonomy
Constantine converted to Christianity in 312 A.D. while commanding a Roman army in a
complex series of civil wars. As Western Emperor, he joined in promulgating the Edict of Milan
in 313 A.D., which legalized Christianity in the Roman Empire and restored property taken
during persecution. By late in the 4th century, Christianity had slowly but surely become the
official religion of the empire. While the resulting church and empire were organizationally
distinct, they formed two aspects of a single whole that we now call Christendom. It was
understood that these two centers of authority would, on the one hand, cooperate in upholding
and defending the church and, on the other, cooperate in unifying citizens around a common
creed thereby giving legitimacy to the empire.
In 1054 A.D., a dispute over polity ripened into a schism that severed the eastern church
in Constantinople from the western church centered at Rome. Unlike the eastern rite, the church
at Rome remained a coequal power, at times dominating monarchs and at times being dominated
by them. The Papal Revolution of 1050-1080 was a series of reforms initiated under Pope
Gregory VII that dealt with the independence of the church and moral conduct of the clergy. 242
The reforms are codified in two major documents: dictatus papae, which centralizes authority in
the papacy, and the libertas ecclesiae papal bull, which is about the freedom of church from
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temporal rulers. 243 The reforms required clerical celibacy, did away with simony (the sale of
ecclesiastical offices and sacred things), and denied civil authorities the power to appoint church
officials. Going forward, the Roman Church wielded its control over sacraments to visit
deprivations upon civil rulers, and those same rulers used their superior military power to force
the church to conform to the wishes of the monarch. It is also fair to say that through all these
back and forth struggles, the church preserved classical culture and nurtured the arts, as well as
ameliorated the harshness of peasant life.
In 1517, the German priest Martin Luther is reputed to have nailed his 95 Theses to the
door of Wittenberg’s Castle Church. The resulting Reformation shattered the unity of Western
Catholic Christianity. The conflagration that ensued lasted for over 130 years, a period that today
we refer to as the “religious wars.” But that is imposing a modern construct on the conflict. For
the combatants, there was no pronounced demarcation between the civil and the religious.
Rather, what unified the political core of each state was its religious worldview. An interim
settlement was reached at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555, with the adoption of the simple, if
crude, principle of cuios regio, eius religio (whose region, his religion). The Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648, ending the Thirty Years’ War, left Catholics in control of the continental
south and Protestants established in the north. The horror and dissipation of the wars
strengthened the hand of the secular rulers at the expense of the churches, and this was especially
so in the case of Protestants because of their internal division and their greater dependence on the
military protection of the princes.
The Westphalian settlement that emerged entailed sovereign nation-states with marked
borders at which access could be controlled, an established church, and religious dissenters.
Dissenters were often persecuted or driven into exile, in large measure because the presence of
nonconformists within the political polity was thought to destabilize the state. The persecution
was always at the hands of the state, but the churches were complicit. Growing abhorrence at the
violence wrought by religious persecution, the stubbornness of dissenters even unto death, and
the emerging influence of the Enlightenment caused the pattern to evolve yet again in the
direction of sovereign states, established churches, and juridical toleration of nonconforming
sects.
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The English Reformation was different from that on the continent. It began with Henry
VIII’s desire to annul his marriage to Catherine whom he thought unable to bear him a male heir.
When the Pope refused, Henry, with the complicity of Parliament, passed the 1534 Act of
Supremacy establishing the Church of England with himself as its supreme head. 244 This set-in
motion a long series of attempts to reclaim Great Britain for the Roman Church, which in turn
worked to generate deep-seated anti-Catholicism among a majority of the English and ScotsIrish. This antipathy toward Catholics would later be carried overseas by those embarking for the
British colonies in North America. During the century-and-a-half from Luther to the 1688-89
Glorious Revolution and coronation of William and Mary, England experienced a Calvinist
Reformation under the child-king Edward VI, a Golden Age under Elizabeth I (who backed the
Church of England to compel religious unity to in turn stabilize the Crown), a civil war between
Anglo-Catholic royalists and Calvinist parliamentarians won by the latter, the Puritan
Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell, Restoration under Charles II, and the forced abdication of his
brother the Catholic James II in favor of the Dutch Protestant William of Orange. The 1689
British Act of Toleration was adopted at the time of the Glorious Revolution; it extended legal
protection to non-Anglican Protestants (but not Catholics).
Such were the church-state relationships and tolerations brought to the British colonies in
North America, in variations both strong and weak. Many of the ancestors of the American
revolutionary generation had come to these shores to escape the religious persecution and tumult
associated with these Old World events. In British America, the pressing religious dynamic was
not Anglicanism versus Catholicism, but Anglicanism versus Congregationalism versus other
Protestants. Yet Old World church-state establishments obtained in the New World early on
except for the special cases of Rhode Island and, partly at least, the Quaker settlement of
Pennsylvania. 245 Maryland was chartered in 1632 as a colony where Catholics were fully
welcome and equal to Protestants, but the colony was taken over by force in 1689 by Anglican
arms. 246
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The Church of England was an agency of the Crown and seen as projecting British policy
into revolutionary America. American patriots (not the Tories) viewed the Church of England as
tyrannical, which was also the view held by the Congregationalists, the established church in
much of New England. American dissenters and Enlightenment statesmen went a step further
and held the view that established churches of any denomination—in their willingness to do the
bidding of the state in service of the state—had corrupted Christianity. 247 This is seen, for
example, in James Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance, 248 as well as the writings of Baptist
ministers Isaac Backus and John Leland. 249 The spiritual corruption was perceived as both
external and internal. The external was the established church imposing burdens of conscience
on nonconforming religions, and the internal was the government entangling itself in the
operations of the established church. The solution, these dissenters and statemen maintained, was
disestablishment. Disestablishment, or the deregulation of religion, would both liberate the
church and enlighten governance by the new republican states.
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor did not even acknowledge—let alone rely on—the
foregoing account of the events on the European continent, with the church’s fluctuating bids for
power over and independence from the government from Constantine through Gregory VII and
eventually to the Westphalian states. 250 Instead, in the view of the Supreme Court, the proper
historical framework for understanding the First Amendment’s doctrine of church autonomy was
nearer in time and closer to home. Under the guiding principle of originalism (although
originalism was not expressly mentioned in Hosanna-Tabor), that meant looking to what
motivated revolutionary Americans on this side of the Atlantic: war with Great Britain, including
rejection of its Church of England model. The opinion’s history begins in earnest with the
English Reformation and the establishment of the Church of England in 1534, 251 moves forward
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to the religious struggles in England and resulting immigration to these shores, then discusses the
First Federal Congress and the adoption of the First Amendment, 252 and finally relates two
incidents involving James Madison and his part in early applications of the Religion Clauses. 253
The legal principles on display in this historical account were then brought to bear on the case at
bar concerning the entanglement of federal nondiscrimination law with the dismissal by a
religious school of one of its teachers who had religious duties. Similarly, in Our Lady the High
Court considered the 16th and 17th century English religious conflicts to have influenced British
emigrants to seek religious freedom in the American colonies. 254 The Court also acknowledged
that the Church of England’s oppressive policies in colonies such as Maryland and New York
were a prelude to the revolution here. 255
The Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady showed no interest in the Papal
Revolution of the 11th century out of which Catholic scholars derive freedom of the church
(libertas ecclesiae). This deprives the Court of some distant principles to undergird the doctrine
of church autonomy, but it also frees it from arguing that the Papal Revolution is a suitable
undergirding for church autonomy as embedded in our late 18th century Constitution.
As noted above, James Madison played a central role in the history that was relied on in
Hosanna-Tabor. Chief Justice Roberts noted the Virginia representative’s central role in drafting
the Religion Clauses in the First Federal Congress, 256 and he relied on two episodes involving
Madison and early applications of those clauses. In the first, Madison as Secretary of State under
Thomas Jefferson declined to involve the U.S. in the appointment of a Catholic bishop in the
Louisiana Territory. 257 The second episode had Madison as President vetoing a bill to
incorporate an Episcopal church in the District of Columbia. In Madison’s veto message, he did
Id. at 183 (“It was against this background that the First Amendment was adopted. Familiar with life under the
established Church of England, the founding generation sought to foreclose the possibility of a national church.”).
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not say the bill was unconstitutional because incorporating a church created a prohibited
establishment. Indeed, it was becoming common at the time for churches to incorporate under
state corporation laws to ease the acquisition and transfer of real property, to limit liability, to
allow lawsuits in the corporate name, and to secure corporate life in perpetuity. Rather,
according to Madison, the particular corporate articles set out in the bill would have deeply
entangled federal officers in the details of removal and appointment of clergy in this particular
church, and that was its constitutional defect. 258
There are additional episodes that buttress the interpretive point made by Chief Justice
Roberts. For example, at a time when military hostilities had ceased with victory at Yorktown in
October 1781 and the states still remained loosely united under the Articles of Confederation, a
well-documented incident occurred that illustrates how profoundly relations between church and
government had shifted in the minds of continental officials in America. At the beginning of the
revolution, the Roman Catholic Church in British North America was under the governance of
Thomas Talbot, Bishop of London. This proved difficult when the colonies declared their
independence and the ensuing war dragged on for seven years. Contact with the church in
London was cut off, making the consecration of priests, the confirmation of young parishioners,
and other episcopal functions unavailable to the faithful in America. Upon the signing of the
Treaty of Paris in 1783, Talbot declared that he no longer exercised ecclesial jurisdiction in the
United States. 259
In response to these difficulties, Catholics in Maryland and Pennsylvania gathered to
devise a solution. The Rev. John Lewis had been appointed as vicar for the American churches
by Talbot’s predecessor. Because of Talbot’s difficulty in communicating with America, Lewis
had been exercising more supervisory authority. The American clergy were pleased with Lewis’
oversight, and in June 1783, they drew up a petition to the Pope requesting that Lewis be made
both Superior and Bishop over the Church in the United States. In the petition, The Rev. John
Carroll of Maryland provides intriguing commentary on the American Catholic view of churchstate relations under the Confederation:
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You are not ignorant that in these United States our religious system has undergone
a revolution, if possible, more extraordinary than our political one. In all of them
free toleration is allowed to Christians of every denomination; and particularly in
the States of Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia, a communication of
all civil rights, without distinction or diminution, is extended to those of our
religion. This is a blessing and advantage which it is our duty to preserve and
improve, with the utmost prudence, by demeaning ourselves on all occasions as
subjects zealously attached to our government and avoiding to give any jealousies
on account of any dependence on foreign jurisdictions more than that which is
essential to our religion, an acknowledgment of the Pope’s spiritual supremacy over
the whole Christian world. 260
Meanwhile, the Catholic clergy in France had plans of their own for the American
Church. The Jesuits had flourished in America during the time of the London Bishop’s oversight,
Talbot having been friendly to that order. However, clergy aligned with the Bourbon monarchs
had urged Pope Clement XIV to dissolve the Society of Jesus, and they succeeded. The French
clergy now sought to undermine the influence of the Jesuits in the infant United States. 261 A
plan, apparently originating with Barbe Marbois, the French Minister to the United States,
received initial support from the Papal Nuncio in Paris. The Nuncio sent instructions to Marbois
in Philadelphia, directing him to petition Congress for authority to appoint a Catholic bishop in
the United States. That would have caused the new American Bishop to receive his instructions
via church authorities in Paris. When Marbois sent the petition to Congress, he received an
unexpected response, yet one that was revealing of American sentiments on relations between
church and government. On May 11, 1784, the congressional journal records the following
resolution:
Resolved, That doctor [Benjamin] Franklin [U.S. Minister to France] be desired to
notify to the apostolical nuncio at Versailles, that Congress will always be pleased
to testify their respect to his sovereign and state; but that the subject of his
application to doctor Franklin, being purely spiritual, it is without the jurisdiction
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and powers of Congress, who have no authority to permit or refuse it, these powers
being reserved to the several states individually. 262
Marbois’ petition was the sort of Old World religious intrigue that Americans abjured. When the
French intentions became public, American Catholics reacted quickly with communications to
Rome to counter the power play and prevent French interference. Pope Pius VI ordered that John
Carroll be appointed Superior for the American clergy with the intent of consecrating him bishop
within the year. A decree dated June 9, 1784, announcing this decision was sent to the American
Catholic Church. In this way, the first American Catholic bishopric was formed, with The Most
Rev. Carroll as bishop answering directly to the Pope. The incident confirms that in the new
United States, any ecclesiastical jurisdictional disputes were outside the authority of the
government. 263
The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 required early applications of the Religion Clauses. This
vast land west of the Mississippi River held a French Catholic establishment which was later
maintained by the Spanish. The new treaty and purchase agreement with France guaranteed the
inhabitants their religious liberty—no small matter as the United States was perceived by the
French inhabitants to be Protestant. The Catholic establishment in Louisiana quietly ceased to
exist as the Spanish Crown no longer paid the priests and Spanish law no longer operated to
support the church. For purposes of the incoming American federal administration, the land was
divided into Orleans Territory, which would largely become the State of Louisiana, and the
District of Louisiana (soon renamed the Missouri Territory), consisting of the rest of the
purchase. In the spring of 1804, the governor of Orleans Territory wrote to Secretary of State
Madison to inform him that local federal authorities had shut the doors of a Catholic parish
church “in response to a conflict between two priests concerning who was the rightful leader of
the congregation.” 264 Although the territorial governor was clearly pleased with his manner of
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handling the dispute, President Jefferson, who learned about it from Madison, was not. 265 In a
July 5, 1804, letter to Madison, Jefferson wrote:
[I]t was an error in our officer to shut the doors of the church. . . . The priests must
settle their differences in their own way, provided they commit no breach of the
peace. . . . On our principles all church-discipline is voluntary; and never to be
enforced by the public authority. 266
Jefferson’s warning to not get involved in matters of church polity nor the supervision and
discipline of clergy, was passed from Madison back down to the territorial governor. Only a year
went by before the governor had an opportunity to put to use Jefferson’s legal principle. In the
summer of 1805, the governor became aware of a Spanish priest serving the Church of St. Louis
in New Orleans. The priest was at odds with his superior, who as the Acting Vicar General was
concerned that the priest might have retained his loyalties to Spain. The renegade priest was
ordered removed by the vicar from his appointment to the Church of St. Louis. But the parish
congregation resisted and allowed the priest to continue to conduct worship services. The vicar
reported his dilemma to the territorial governor, an act characteristic of a state-established
church. However, chastened by his earlier mishandling of religious affairs to the disappointment
of Jefferson, the territorial governor did not get involved in the religious dispute. The governor
did, however, ask for an interview with the wayward priest to enquire into possible sedition. 267
Some of the inhabitants of this former French territory had cause to be concerned for the
security of their titles to land. An order of Ursuline nuns had operated a convent, orphanage, and
school for girls and young women in New Orleans since 1727. The sisters had received their
lands from the French Crown as a feature of the established church. The sisters wondered what
this meant for their works of charity and education in a nation they regarded as Protestant but
without an established religion. In a letter dated June 13, 1804, the Mother Superior of the
convent wrote President Jefferson setting forth her anxieties about the security of title to the real
estate used by the Ursuline ministries. A month later, on July 13, Jefferson responded with his
own letter. He began by assuring the nuns that the transfer of control from Catholic France to the
United States would not undermine the ownership of their religious school and the glebe lands
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that supported it. However, Jefferson went further and assured the convent, school, and
orphanage freedom of self-governance and freedom from the superintending hand of
government. As the president explained, “the principles of the constitution . . . are a sure
guaranty to you that [your property] will be preserved to you sacred and inviolate, and that your
institution will be permitted to govern itself according to it’s [sic] own voluntary rules, without
interference from the civil authority.” 268 The latter—the ability to govern itself free of bylaws
except those adopted voluntarily and self-enforced—was a liberty the Ursulines would not have
enjoyed under the French establishment.
These episodes give a taste of how the federal church-government understanding was
implemented in the post-revolutionary period, and they show that church autonomy was
presupposed where the government would otherwise have become entangled in the internal
governance of religious ministries. These accounts confirm that Hosanna-Tabor and Our Lady
were on target.
V.

CONCLUSION

Over 230 years after adoption of the First Amendment, the doctrine of church autonomy,
and its ministerial exception in particular, remain projects under development. Yet the most
important features of these concepts were settled in Kedroff and Hosanna-Tabor. The Supreme
Court has recognized the doctrine of church autonomy since at least Watson, and the doctrine has
a body of precedent different from those lines of cases decided under the Free Exercise Clause
and the Establishment Clause, respectively. Church autonomy protects churches, religious
schools, and other genuinely religious organizations, but not as entities with freedom of
association rights like any other organization, and not as mere voluntary associations
representing the aggregate rights of their individual members. Rather, it protects them as
ontological beings. Churches and other genuinely religious organizations are tacitly
acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court to exist in their own right, and not because the
government or the positive law is willing to recognize that they exist. Indeed, these organizations
preexisted the state, and they transcend the state in that they are not confined to the recognized
borders of a Westphalian state. The doctrine thereby has the state acknowledging that it is not all
powerful. Surely this is an encouraging incident of secular modesty.
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In an adversarial system, church autonomy will always be contested out on the frontiers.
However, building on Watson and Kedroff, the High Court has strongly reaffirmed in the seminal
case of Hosanna-Tabor that a religious organization’s internal governance is a government-free
zone. And while the ministerial exception is an affirmative defense for purposes of pleading and
pretrial practice, once its prima facie elements are proven-up by the religious organization the
doctrine of church autonomy affords a categorical immunity, rooted in the Constitution, that
cannot be waived—the strongest protection available in law.
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